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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s have brought, a changed economic climate that has caused
financial stress in the agricultural sector. The financial stress has
hit many farmers hard and cooperatives as an extension of the farm
business have been affected as well. Figure 1.1 shows the decrease in
the number of farmer cooperatives due to reorganizations and
liquidations. Despite the general decreasing trend, cooperatives have
increased their proportion of products marketed and supplies purchased by
the farmer. Figure 1.2 presents the general increase.
In the 1960s and 1970s when volumes marketed and inputs purchased
were increasing (via increasing exports), cooperatives expanded their
capacity with many capital intensive investments. This expansion
occurrec throughout the federated cooperative system. An effort was made
to create a stronger agent through which producer members could purchase
their inputs and sell their products. However, recent conditions in the
export and domestic markets and government programs such as PIK have
reduced cooperative business. Lower volumes in marketing/processing
activities and reductions in supply input activities have occurred in
many cooperatives.
The decreased vol\imes have created excess capacity and have caused
an income squeeze at each level of the federated cooperative system. For
an increasing number of cooperatives, the income squeeze has resulted in
the cooperative suffering operating losses. These losses have resulted
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Figure 1.2 Farmer cooperative's share of products marketed
and supplies purchased by producers
from a combination of high levels of noncontrollable expenses (such as
depreciation and interest expense) and insufficient gross margins (due to
low sales volumes) to cover them. For these reasons, the losses have
been difficult to avoid and management alternatives to prevent them are
limited.
With such losses occurring at all levels of the cooperative system,
there has been concern that traditional methods of handling losses may be
inappropriate. As larger and more frequent losses occur, a large burden
must ultimately be borne by the producer members. It is the overall
objective of this study to document the size and frequency of cooperative
losses and determine the economic implications that alternative loss
distribution methods might have on the cooperative and its members.
Cooperative Background
To explore cooperative losses, an understanding is needed of the
financial and organizational characteristics unique to cooperatives.
Three major characteristics to consider are the federated cooperative
system, operation at cost, and the cooperative's objective.
Federated cooperative system
The federated cooperative system starts with producer members
financing the local cooperative. The local holds equity in the regional
cooperative which in turn holds equity in the interregional cooperative.
Thus, in the federated system "members" may refer to producers, local
cooperatives, and/or regional cooperatives in a hierarchy that extends
from the farm to the interregional cooperative. Figure 1.3 below
presents a graphic representation of the system's structure. In the
federated system, ownership and equity financing at the local cooperative
level implies that net savings (losses and gains) must reach the
producers via the local allocation.
Interregional
Cooperative
Regional
Cooperative
Local
Cooperative
Member
Producer 10 11
Figure 1.3 Graphic representation of the federated cooperative system
It should also be stated that members do not finance cooperatives
solely for direct financial returns on capital invested. Although
returns represent a benefit, members finance the cooperative in part
because they want access to markets where they may buy and sell. They
want the competitive advantages that large numbers acting collectively
will bring in marketing their products or purchasing production inputs.
They want the assurance that necessary inputs will be available in times
of shortage.
Figure 1.3 may also represent the centralized cooperative system.
However, the critical question of ownership and control at the local
cooperative level is different. In contrast to the federated cooperative
system, the centralized cooperative system exists without the
independently owned and controlled local cooperatives. The producers
hold direct membership in and directly control the regional. The local
cooperatives become distribution centers owned and directly controlled by
the regional rather than by the producers. Thus, in a centralized system
net savings (losses and savings) reach members via direct regional
allocation to members. The focus of this study is on the federated
cooperative system rather than the centralized system.
The financial relationship between the members and the cooperative
is a key aspect of cooperative accounting and financial management. The
federated cooperative system is capitalized from the bottom up through
investment (equity) relationships. These relationships are similar
between each level of the system. Members finance their cooperatives by
direct and indirect investment. Direct Investment is made when members
purchase nontransferable stock using cash. Indirect investment is made
when members conduct business with the cooperative and allow a portion of
the patronage to be retained as equity in the cooperative.
The cooperative distinguishes these types of investments by dividing
member equity into components of purchased equity (common stock) and
allocated equity (qualified and/or nonqualified retained patronage). The
member should carry these investments as an asset on its balance sheet.
Usually, the cooperative has an additional component of equity (called
unallocated retained earnings) that the member does not carry as an
investment.
Figure 1.4 helps clarify this discussion by expressing a
hypothetical set of investment and equity relationships between the
regional and the local cooperatives and between the local cooperative and
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the producer. In some cases, regional cooperatives may have an analogous
relationship with an interregional cooperative.
The key aspect of the federated cooperative system for this study is
the financial linkages that exist between the levels. As net savings are
passed down through the system as deferred patronage, equity is passed up
through the system.
Operation at cost with gains or losses
Cooperatives are expected to operate on a cost basis. Cooperative
statutes and the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) state that an exempt
cooperative should return all net savings (allowing for exceptions and
specific requirements about required or reasonable reserve, dividends on
capital stock, and/or proportions of nonmember business) to the patrons
in proportion to their business conducted with the cooperative (1). To
fully understand the implications of this statement, it is desirable to
examine its components.
The terra net savings (also referred to as earnings) is confined to
ordinary net savings which the Code defines as income after reasonable
(or necessary) deductions for expenses incurred. Ordinary net savings
are earnings resulting from normal business operations of the
cooperative. In contrast, extraordinary net savings may include earnings
resulting from unusual circumstances of the business. For example, a
gain or loss from the sale of a fixed asset would be considered an
extraordinary net savings item not related to ongoing business
operations.
Although extraordinary net gains and losses have been occurring more
regularly as cooperatives divest fixed assets to reduce expenses, they do
not represent the majority of cooperative net savings. Furthermore, they
are subject to different tax treatment under the Code and present
difficulties in assigning such earnings to current members. Therefore,
the focus of the study was confined to the portion of cooperative
earnings defined as ordinary net savings by the Code (positive net
savings were referred to as savings or gains in this study but do not
include extraordinary gains).
The way that net savings are returned to members is important
because the distribution method affects the financial and tax position of
both the cooperative and its members. Some positive level of net savings
(gross income greater than expenses) is generally intended and achieved
in cooperative operations. These earnings are usually distributed by the
board cf directors according to the cooperative's bylaws in one (or
combination) of the following four ways: 1) cash, 2) qualified allocated
equity, 3) nonqualified allocated equity, and 4) unallocated retained
earnings. The workings and specifics of each of these can be found in
VanSickle and Ladd (22) or Touche Ross (1), as well as the Code.
IRS viewpoints and letter rulings on taxation of cooperative net
savings under various methods of distribution are also of importance.
The IRS through interpretion of federal law and usage of court cases and
rulings have provided guidelines to follow. Three principles that have
emerged are as follows: 1) cooperatives should operate at cost, 2) net
savings should be distributed in an equitable fashion, and 3) net savings
should be traced and allocated to the patrons in accordance to the
approximate amount of business done by each (1). These principles imply
that net savings are to be returned to the cooperative's patrons (member
or nonmember) based on patronage whether the net savings are positive or
negative.
Recently there has been "...considerable uncertainty about proper
tax treatment of net operating loss allocation..." (20, p. 25). The
uncertainty is due to many factors. Part of the uncertainty has been due
to the changing positions taken by the IRS and the fact that the courts
have at times been inconsistent in backing the IRS's position. Some of
the ambiguity arises from applying loss allocation methods under the Code
which makes no specific mention of losses (20). To make matters more
complicated, the applicable court cases and rulings are frequently based
upon a variety of different characteristics and practices of
cooperatives. Some decisions are based upon whether the cooperative is a
section 521 or a nonsection 521 cooperative. Others have been rendered
on the basis of whether the income is patronage or nonpatronage based,
and still others on whether the income is netted over different
departments or kept separated. Useful guidelines for specifics in these
areas are provided in writings by Touche Ross (1) and Baarda (2 and in
20).
Cooperative's objective
Since no specific guidelines concerning the handling of losses are
provided by the Code or cooperative statutes, by-laws may be a useful
vehicle to establish these practices. Unfortunately, individual
cooperative's bylaws usually ignore the topic also. It is appropriate to
10
apply the net member benefit criterion to losses as well as savings
(gains). Cooperatives like all business firms face the risk of periodic
losses. Changes in the business environment, weather patterns,
government policies, and the level of risk assumed in the operations may
at any time create a situation where a loss occurs.
Many of the decisions regarding earnings distribution depend on what
the cooperative perceives as its objective. Generally, business firms
(including cooperatives) may choose among numerous objectives, such as
maximizing sales, maximizing net income, or maximizing shareholders
wealth. One valid objective for a cooperative is the maximization of net
member benefits, after-tax, as discussed by Ladd (12). It is this
objective that will be assumed as the cooperatives guide for the purposes
of this study.
Even if a local cooperative operates with positive savings at the
local level, it is possible (in the federated cooperative system) for
local patrons to receive negative patronage refunds. Operating losses
generated by the regional cooperative and passed to the local may exceed
local savings and create a net loss. There are three situations vhere
net savings available for distribution to local patrons may be negative.
Figure 1.5 presents these three situations which are based on the preaise
that netting of regional cind local savings is sound even with the
uncertainty discussed earlier.
Thus, cooperative boards of directors need to carefully consider
loss management strategies whether or not a local loss is sustained.
Recent literature by Touche Ross (1), Baarda (2), Junge (11), and various
11
Situation Situation Situation
One Two Three
Local Savings small gain large loss loss
+ Regional Patr. large loss small gain loss
= Net Savings loss loss loss
Figure 1.5 Three situations where net savings results in a loss
seminars and articles by the Agricultural Cooperative Service (20)
provide some guidance in distributing net savings, negative as well as
positive. Additionally, Junge's thesis (11) has done some preliminary
analysis on allocation of losses using a simulation model which offers a
more practical analysis to the problem.
Objectives and Procedure
It is hypothesized that the economic environment of the 1980s has
created larger and more frequent losses. Analysis and research is needed
to inform cooperative personnel, boards and patrons, about the impacts of
cooperative losses and how losses affect the cooperative's objective of
maximizing net member benefits. The purpose of this study is to extend
the initial work performed by Junge (11) on cooperative losses.
Objectives
The specific objectives are as follows:
1) Analyze the past performance of selected regional cooperatives by
documenting net savings and the methods of distributing those net
savings.
2) Analyze the past performance of a sample of Midwestern local
12
cooperatives by examining net savings variability, allocation methods,
and equity classification.
3) Analyze the financial effects when alternative methods of
distributing losses were employed. Examine the specific impacts of
holding or passing losses originating at the local and at the regional
cooperative levels on the locals' and members' cashflow, taxes, and
equity accounts.
4) Determine the effect of regional losses on the local cooperative's
valuation of its regional investments.
Methods employed
To fulfill these objectives, this study uses a variety of analytical
tools.
To document the past net savings performance of regional and local
cooperatives, samples of cooperative financial data were analyzed.
Annual reports which contained the present and past publicly available
audited financial statements were obtained. Using these data, average
net savings and distribution strategies were examined and compared to
earlier strategies to identify changes that have occurred over the years.
A quantitative comparison of loss distribution methods was
conducted. Different methods of handling losses that occurred at the
regional or local levels were examined. The quantitative comparison
focused on the financial and tax consequences of distribution strategies
selected by the local and/or regional cooperative.
Specifically the study addressed local cooperative strategies of
holding or passing its net savings (positive or negative). To make
13
quantitative comparisons, a computer model was used to simulate financial
statements in accordance with generally accepted cooperative accounting
principles. Using the model, comparisons could be made consistently
between distribution strategies for the regional and local cooperatives
among various regional-local net savings combinations (holding other
factors constant).
The importance of a local cooperative's investment in a regional
cooperative was examined under the assumption that the regional
cooperative sustained a loss. The importance was determined by the local
and regional cooperatives' dependence on their investments relative to
total equity and total assets. Quantitative estimates were made as to the
effects on debt-to-equity ratios of writing off a portion of the
cooperatives' investment.
14
CHAPTER 2. ANALYSIS OF COOPERATIVE SYSTEM'S PAST EARNINGS
Analysis was conducted to show the frequency and size of losses
being suffered by Midwest local cooperatives, as well as the regional and
interregional cooperatives serving them. The analysis focused on
earnings of the 1980s. A small sample of federated regional and
interregional cooperatives were examined for earnings variability and
earnings distribution methods. A large sample of local cooperatives was
then examined for these same earnings characteristics and compared to
results of an earlier study to show the basis for increased concern about
using appropriate loss distribution methods.
Federated Cooperative Analysis
The federated cooperative sample consisted of four regional and two
interregional cooperatives. The data were constructed from each
cooperative's publicly available 1981, 1982, and 1983 consolidated
reports. To construct the data, two methods were available; (1) build
the data from the historic comparison in the 1983 reports or (2) use each
year's annual report for the corresponding data. Data for a particular
year were sometimes inconsistent with past annual reports due
to accounting changes or discontinued operations. Generally, the
accounting changes from report to report were not as significant as
the discrepancies from year to year due to discontinued operations.
Therefore, the data for each year were extracted from its corresponding
annual report (Except for one cooperative whose three years of data came
15
from just the 1983 annual report.)-
The three years of data for each cooperative consisted of selected
balance sheet and operating statement aggregates. With such a small
sample of federated cooperatives and the wide diversity of size and
operations, it was difficult to draw conclusions about the historic
financial situation of federated cooperatives. However, the data did
provide information concerning earnings variability and earnings
distribution methods.
Earnings variability
The earnings among the federated cooperatives varied greatly. In
1981, the range of net savings allocated was observed as -$3,946,000 to
$68,587,000. In 1982, the range extended from -$98,474,000 to
$21,688,000. In 1983, the range extended from -$15,983,000 to $66,051,000
Table 2.1 shows these values as well as the mean.
The net savings were variable within the cooperatives as
well as among them. The range of net savings allocated over the last
three years by each of the federated cooperatives demonstrates this.
Table 2.1 shows the net savings distributed for 1981, 1982, and 1983.
The standard deviation could be calculated and then used to apply
a two standard deviation rule above and below the mean to give a
95% confidence interval for each cooperative. Though the means
and standard deviations are useful in this way to present the variability
of earnings, the number of observations were judged too low to construct
confidence intervals or significance testing. Whether the confidence
intervals or the ranges are used to show variability, the net savings
16
Table 2.1 1981, 1982, and 1983 net savings distributed by
the federated cooperatives (in $1,000)
Cooperative 1981 1982 1983 Mean
A 68,587 -32,241 -15,983 17,443
B -3,946 -19,165 10,036 -4,358
C 4,649 -3,206 3,390 1,611
D 44,281 21,688 15,631 27,200
E 4,563 1,221 2,151 2,645
F 65,582 -98,474 66,051 11,053
available for distribution was found to be quite variable within the
regional cooperatives examined.
Earnings distribution
The methods that the federated regional cooperatives used to
distribute earnings were interesting. With six federated cooperatives
and three years of data, 18 individual observations of net savings
distribution were examined. The normal procedure for the cooperative
with positive net savings was to distribute a major portion (70-90%) of
these earnings as qualified allocated patronage refunds with 35-50% of
the qualified allocation as cash. The remaining net savings (10-30%)
were distributed to unallocated retained earnings.
When losses occurred, the distribution of net savings was different
and influences the distribution of savings in subsequent years. Five
instances of'loss occurred among four of the six federated cooperatives.
In three of the cases, the cooperatives held the loss by distributing it
as unallocated retained earnings. The following year these same three
cooperatives held all or most of the positive net savings. Thus, the
retention of the savings acted to replenish the unallocated retains
17
account that was depleted by holding the prior years loss.
In the other two loss instances, the cooperative pursued a strategy
of partially passing and holding the loss in a proportion of
approximately 60/40 percent. This cooperative along with another
cooperative continued to pass positive amounts to members as equity
and/or cash even though losses occurred. These positive distributions
probably occurred because some departments did not sustain a loss and
savings were not netted with those that did run a loss. It is also
possible that the positive distributions occurred to avoid bad member
relations that passed losses may cause. The latter practice may put an
additional financial stress on the cooperative.
One federated cooperative distributed nonqualified allocated equity
in 1982 and 1983 and retired some as well in 1983. The nonqualifieds
were used an a minor portion of the total allocations and none of the
loss instances occurred in this cooperative. Whether the allocation was
intended as experimental or as part of a plan, the observation provides
evidence that some regional cooperatives use nonqualifieds and may
consider the possibility of handling a loss through nonqualifieds.
Local Cooperative Analysis
The locdl cooperative sample consisted of over 600 local
cooperatives from ten Midwestern states. The data for each cooperative
sampled consisted of balance sheet and operating statement variables
obtained from 1984 and 1982 records (and in some cases 1980). The 1984
data were the most recent audited statements available as of December
18
1984. Due to fall closing dates and the fact that final audit reports are
sometimes not available for three months after the cooperative s fiscal
year ends, the data of some cooperatives were 1983 data. These statements
contained the tyoe of financial information normally made available to
members at the cooperatives' annual meetings and made publicly available.
The analysis of the local cooperative sample was conducted in two
steps. First, the whole sample was examined for earnings variability to
show the increased incidence of losses. Second, a subset of the local
cooperative sample was examined to show distribution methods currently
being used. As a summary, the results presented were compared with the
results of an earlier study to show how earnings distribution has been
influenced by the increased size and frequency of losses.
Earnings variability
In a discussion of variability, upside and downside variability are
usually considered. However, with net savings of a competitive
cooperative there usually is not too much concern about the upside
variability. The cooperative is not concerned because it is competitive
and its members are not concerned. The members are not concerned because
the net savings normally are allocated to them. Thus, the focus of the
concern will be on the size and frequency of downside earnings, negative
savings (net and local). Local savings was defined as the earnings
derived from operations of the local cooperative. Net savings was
defined as the combined local savings and regional patronage refunds
received.
Negative savings as a net or local figure were easily visible in the
19
sample. Tables 2.2a and 2.2b present the frequencies and averages of the
net and local losses for each of the two years. In 1984, 172 (or 28%) of
the 619 cooperatives sampled suffered negative net savings and 217 (or
35%) of them suffered negative local savings. In 1982, only 101 of the
617 cooperatives sampled suffered negative net savings and 191 suffered
negative local savings. Thus, from 1982 to 1984 the relative frequency
of net losses and local losses increased by 70% and 14%, respectively.
The large relative increase in the frequency of net losses could be the
result of lower regional patronage and/or larger local losses. The 10%
increase in the average local loss was accompanied by an 18% increase in
Table 2.2a Averages of 1982 net and local savings for a sample
of local cooperatives from 10 Midwestern states
Average
Net Savings: # % §
Overall 617 100 158,345 (includes two with
Positive 514 83 211,782 zero net savings)
Negative 101 16 -110,465
Local Savings:
Overall 616 100 86,281
Positive 425 69 177,604
Negative 191 31 -116,926
Table 2.2b Averages of 1984 net. and local savings for a sample
of local cooperatives from 10 Midwestern states
Average
I^et Savings: # % $
Overall 619 100 102,216 (includes two with
Positive 445 72 192,630 zero net savings)
Negative 172 28 -130,515
Local Savings:
Overall 619 100 73,336
Positive 402 65 182,152
Negative 217 35 -128,250
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the average net loss which implies a result of a combination, of larger
local losses and smaller regional patronage refunds to net against them.
As further evidence of how the size and frequency of cooperative
losses have changed over the decade it was useful to obtain earlier data.
Three of the ten Midwestern states had such data available. The results
of the analysis are in Tables 2.3a, 2.3b, and 2.3c follow.
Again net and local losses were easily visible. Negative net
savings occurred in 2% of the 1980 cooperatives sampled, 17% of the 1982
cooperatives sampled, and 29% of the 1984 cooperatives sampled. However,
this increasing trend was not seen in either the absolute size of the
cooperatives' net losses or the frequency of negative local savings. But
the average net loss and the frequency of local losses did increase
overall from the 1980 data to the 1984 data. Negative local savings did
show an increasing trend in the size of the loss from -$124,233 in 1980
to -$137,722 in 1982 to -$157,419 in 1984. The average regional
patronage refunds for the three state data decreased from $137,078 in
1980 to $73,115 in 1982 to $27,479 in 1984. Thus, the trends found in
the 10 state data were confirmed in the three state data. The more
frequent net losses over the four year period appears to have been due to
larger local losses coupled with smaller regional patronage refunds.
Earnings d i s 1:r ibution
To analyze the distribution of net savings, a subsample of the ten
state sample was used. The analysis was performed on a subsample due to
two factors. First, the data were coded for the purpose of another
project. The correct variables to derive net savings allocation were not
21
Table 2.3a Averages and statistical measures of 1980 net and local savings
for a local cooperative sample from 3 Midwestern states
Standard
Average Deviation Minimum Maximum
# % $ $ $ $
Net Savings:
Overall 241 100 305,571 332,327 -320,333 3,302,761
Positive 236 98 314,906 329,190 5,184 3,302,761
Negative 5 2 -135,066 110,115 -320,333 -29,573
Local Savings:
Overall 241 100 170,200 245,052 -710,673 1,717,543
Positive 213 88 208,905 228,516 1,215 1,717,543
Negative 28 12 -124,233 148,477 -710,673 -9,379
Table 2.3b Averages and statistical measures of !1982 net and local savings
for a local cooperative sample from 3 Midwestern states
Standard
Average Deviation Minimum Maximum
it % $ $ $ $
Net Savings:
Overall 241 100 135,738 229,993 -985,224 1,410,279
Positive 201 83 187,259 200,640 270 1,410,279
Negative 40 17 -123,155 191,443 -985,224 -1,405
Local Savings:
Overall 241 100 63,836 235,230 -1,121,984 1,288,076
Positive 165 68 156,675 187,569 1,583 1,288,076
Negative 76 32 -137,722 200,012 -1,121,984 -596
Table 2.3c Averages and statistical measures of 1984 net and local savings
for a local cooperative sample from 3 Midwestern states
Standard
Average Deviation Minimum Maximum
# % $ $ $ $
Net Savings:
Overall 242 100 115,249 300,274 -1,138,647 2,656,547
Positive 183 76 200,509 273,573 1,641 2,656,547
Negative 59 24 -149,202 213,834 -1,138,647 -2,524
Local Savings:
Overall 242 100 88,110 301,943 -1,183,218 2,541,613
Positive 172 71 188,035 268,105 521 2,541,613
Negative 70 29 -157,419 232,913 -1,183,218 -5,124
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coded in the data and thus computer derivation was not possible. Second,
there was not enough time or resources available to manually calculate
the allocation methods of all 619 cooperatives in a consistent manner.
The 126 Iowa cooperatives were chosen to represent the sample because of
its consistency with the frequencies and averages just presented. The
Iowa frequencies and averages for the different types of net savings are
shown below in Tables 2.4a, 2.4b, and 2.4c.
To derive the distribution methods, net savings were compared to the
changes in unallocated retains and allocated equity accounts and to the
levels of cash patronage, taxes, and equity retirement as uses of funds.
In most cases, the distribution methods could be approximated with a high
degree of accuracy due to the fact that the balance sheet represents an
identity. Fourteen of the 126 cooperatives had distribution procedures
that were mor»^ difficult to determine with certainty because net savings
did not match the increases and/or decreases in the balance sheet.
Usually, this was due to abnormal amounts of tax paid or not paid and
losses occurring in the previous year. Since the cases did not involve
cash patronage, the net savings were assumed to be handled via
unallocated retained earnings and were included in the analysis.
However, one cooperative's procedure was ambiguous altogether and was
excluded from' the results below.
Of the 125 cooperatives, 28 (or 22%) of them sustained losses.
Twenty-seven of these cooperatives held the whole loss by distributing it
to unallocated retained earnings. The other cooperative distributed just
over 50% of the loss to its members and held the remainder via
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Table 2.4a Averages and statistical measures of 1980 net and local
savings for the local cooperative sample from Iowa
Standard
Average Deviation Minimum Maximum
# % $ $ $ 5
Net Savings:
Overall 126 100 333,694 298,494 -320,333 1,274,757
Positive 121 96 353,064 287,877 5,184 1,274,757
Negative 5 4 -135,065 110,115 -320,333 -29,573
Local Savings :
Overall 126 100 167,289 265,080 -710,673 1,274,757
Positive 103 82 236,505 232,847 1,215 1,274,757
Negative 23 18 -142,678 158,103 -710,673 -9,379
Table 2.4b Averages and statistical measures of 1982 net and local
savings for the local cooperative sample from Iowa
Standard
Average Deviation Minimum Maximum
#
Of
/o $ $ $ $
Net Savings:
Overall 126 100 133,661 232,665 -985,224 1,131,359
Positive 101 80 201,152 186,000 270 1,131,359
Negative 25 20 -139,003 202,934 -985,224 -6,060
Local Savings
Overall 126 100 46,591 24],041 -1,121,984 994,947
Positive 78 62 167,221 178,899 1,583 994,947
Negative 48 38 -149,434 196,715 -1,121,984 -596
Table 2.4c Averages and statistical measures of 1984 net and local
savings for the local cooperative sample from Iowa
Standard
Deviation MinimumAverage Maximum
// % $ $ $ 5
Net Savings:
Overall 126 100 92,561 252,867 -1,138,647 848,506
Positive 97 77 180,247 168,652 3,174 848,506
Negative 29 23 -200,735 268,705 -1,138,647 -2,524
Local Savings:
Overall 126 100 58,885 265,068 -1,183,218 770,153
Positive 88 70 169,228 162,446 3,999 770,153
Negative 38 30 -196,645 281,604 -1,183,218 -5,124
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unallocated retained earnings. None of the cooperatives suffering losses
totally passed the loss to its members.
The remaining 97 cooperatives had positive net savings to
distribute. Thirty-one of these cooperatives (or 25% of the sample) still
distributed net savings to unallocated retained earnings and the federal
income tax liabilities due on such a distribution. In some cases, such a
distribution followed a year in which a loss had been sustained. In
other cases, the net savings were so small that it was questionable
whether or not the effort and expense required to distribute it to the
members was justified.
The other 66 cooperatives (53% of the sample) having positive net
savings distributed their savings in a combination of unallocated retains
and qualified allocated equities. The average distribution to
unallocated retains was 32% but the range extended from 5% to 75%. The
average distribution to allocated equity was 68%. These 66 cooperatives
were required to pay at least 20% of any qualified allocation as cash.
Forty-six of the cooperatives paid this minimum level. The other 20
cooperatives had cash patronage payout that averaged 36% with some as
high as 100%. The average cash patronage of the 66 cooperatives was 25%
and of the 97 cooperatives with positive net savings (including the 31
cooperatives"paying no cash patronage), only 17%.
None of the Iowa cooperatives distributed net savings through the
use of nonqualified allocated equity.
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Summary
As a summary it would be useful to compare the results of the
analysis given here with the 1976 results given by Griffen et al. (8).
Difficulties arose in directly comparing the two sets of results due to
the methods of analysis. Griffen's analysis was conducted on 1976 data
for 5,795 cooperatives. The differences in the number of observations
(5795 compared to 619) and the types of cooperatives (due to products
marketed in various geographic locations) were difficult to avoid
considering the scope of this (Brase's) study. Despite these
difficulties the two sets of results were used to reinforce the results
found in the 1980/1982/1984 comparison just discussed. In some cases,
Griffen's analysis provided data from the three Farm Credit districts of
the Upper Midwest (headquartered in St. Paul, Omaha, and St. Louis). The
results of such data were more comparable but were not much different
from the \^hole sample.
Of the 5,795 cooperatives in Griffen's analysis, 560 of them (or
9.7%) had sustained net operating losses. The three Farm Credit
districts accounted for 2,894 of the cooperatives and 221 of the losses
(a 7.6% frequency of loss occurrence). The 1984 local cooperative sample
discussed earlier had 217 of 619 cooperatives (or 35%) suffering negative
local savings' and 172 of 619 cooperatives (28%) suffering negative net
savings. The average negative net savings of these 172 cooperatives was
-$130,515. Griffen's analysis had an average net operating loss of
-$95,893. Table 2.5 below compares the averages and frequencies of the
two studies for the three types of earnings. It indicates that the
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Table 2.5 Comparison of averages and frequencies for various
types of earnings
1984 analysis 1976 analysis
by Griffen
Weighted
Average Average
# % $ # % ?
Total Earnings 619 100 102,216 5,687 100 324,300
Positive Earnings 445 72 192,630 5,127 90 370,200
Negative Earnings 172 28 -130,515 560 10 -95,893
Zero Earnings 2 108
Note: Earnings refers to net savings and net operating
for 1984 analysis and Griffen's analysis, respectively.
frequencies and sizes of losses have increased.
Griffen's analysis found the equity make up as shown in column one
of Table 2.6. Column two contains Griffen's figures adjusted to match
the definitions of equity components used in breaking out the Iowa sample
proportions. Iowa's average equity make up is shown in column three.
Table 2.6 shows the increased frequency and magnitude of unallocated
retains and purchased equity. It seems to suggest precautionary
distributions.
Table 2.6 Comparison of average proportions of equity components
Iowa
Griffen's Analysis 1984
Original Adjusted analysis
(%) C%) C%)
Common stock 16.3
Membership Cert. .4 16.7 21.1 Purchased Equity
Preferred stock 18.1
Cert, of Equity 50.1 68.2 51.1 Allocated Equity
Unallocated 15.1 15.1 26.9 Unallocated Ret.
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The average methods of distribution or allocation of earnings are
shown in Table 2.7 for both Griffen's 1976 analysis and the Iowa 1984
analysis. The breakdown of the loss allocation does not change for
Griffen's analysis when only considering the cooperatives from the three
Farm Credit districts of the Upper Midwest. However, these data showed
that 80% of the cooperatives having a loss distributed that loss through
unallocated retained earnings. If the results of these two projects can
be directly compared, then the strategies of net savings distribution
have changed from 1976.
Table 2.7 Comparison of average methods of earnings distribution
under net savings and net loss
Net Savings Net Loss
Griffen Iowa Griffen Iowa
Methods % % % %
Patr. Ref. - Cash 39 8 17
- Noncash 44 38 29 2
Dividends 2
Unallocated Retains 8 54 54 98
Income Taxes 6
Notes: 1) Iowa's averages under net savings includes the 31
cooperatives which distributed 100% unallocated retains. Without
these, the average distribution to unallocated retains is 32%.
2) Iowa's proportion of earnings distributed as
unallocated retains includes the taxes paid on them.
3) Griffen's loss allocations include accounts
receivable deductions and direct billings for cooperatives using
these practices.
4) Iowa's distributions were approximations. There were
no explicit data especially on accounts receivable deductions or
direct billings since these practices are not usually used in Iowa
cooperatives.
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Conclusions
The frequencies and sizes of ordinary net losses and the strategies
of earnings distribution for both the local and federated cooperatives
were documented. Earnings variability was examined to show the frequency
and size of losses occurring. It can be concluded that the probability
of the cooperative sustaining a loss have become greater. Earnings
distribution was examined to determine the methods that cooperatives have
used. A trend toward more cautious distributions was found, but few
cases where losses were passed to members were found. Cooperative boards
may not fully understand the alternative methods of allocation and their
ramification on the cooperative and its members. Added information and
analysis may be needed to determine which is best for the cooperative and
its members.
The results of the local and federated cooperative analysis are
listed below.
1) The frequency of losses have increased during the first half of the
1980s.
2) Fundamental problems at the local level were apparent in 1982 but
were covered up in some cases by the regionals' distributions.
3) The average size of net losses has increased. At the local level
this was due'to larger local operating losses and lower regional
patronage refunds to cover them.
4) The cooperatives* equity components show an increasing proportional
share of equity held as unallocated retains.
5) In general, the presence of increased losses has spurred
29
cooperative boards to be more precautionary in the distribution of
savings. The distribution of losses has been handled via unallocated
retains without evidence that boards seriously considered other
alternatives.
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CHAPTER 3. ALTERNATIVES FOR ALLOCATION OF
COOPERATIVE LOSSES TO PATRONS
This chapter is focused on alternative loss allocation
(distribution) methods. After a brief discussion of legal loss
distribution methods a quantitative comparison is presented using a
cooperative accounting simulation model. The computer model allows
analysis on the financial impacts that certain distribution methods have
on the cooperative and its members.
Legal Methods of Loss Allocation
Four general methods of allocation for distributing positive
earnings are recognized by cooperative statutes and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). These same general methods can be extended to allocate
losses or negative net savings. When a loss occurs it may be handled via
1) direct billing, 2) reductions in allocated equity (qualified and/or
nonqualified), and 3) reductions in unallocated retained earnings. To a
limited degree an additional method, 4), of carrying the loss forward to
be offset by subsequent years savings also exists. Each of these
allocation methods are briefly discussed below.
Direct billing
A direct billing can be handled in two ways. First, the loss could
be charged as a direct assessment to the members. This is the opposite
or reverse of a positive cash patronage allocation. Instead of a check
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issued from the cooperative to the patron the cooperative would send a
bill (direct assessment) to each of the members based on patronage.
Alternatively, the loss may be transferred to an account receivable and
carried as a patron liability to the cooperative into the next period.
This method assumes that (1) the member will continue to conduct business
with the cooperative and (2) positive net savings distributed to the
patrons from future business will offset the current loss.
Charging a direct assessment passes the loss to members but requires
an outlay of funds by the member. The direct assessment has tax
consequences similar to other means of passing losses. When the loss is
passed to a member, it may be used to reduce the level of ordinary income
which is subject to federal income tax and FICA. Since the member can
carry the loss backward three years or forward fifteen years, it may be
used to offset income in past or future years (9). If the patron has
taxable income in the present year, has had in past years, and/or will
have in future years, then the member will benefit from the cooperative
passing the loss. However, the outlay of cash will cause a negative net
cashflow to the member. Since the outlay of cash will be greater than
the tax benefit of the passed loss, patrons may not find this acceptable.
In general, it is risky for the cooperative to assess members a
portion of the loss and demand cash payment when the patron has the
alternative of dealing with a firm not assessing for a loss. When the
cooperative represents the only viable source of goods or marketing
services, such assessments may be more practical.
Transferring the loss to an account receivable is somewhat more
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acceptable but is not without risk. If the member discontinues doing
business with the cooperative in the next period, the cooperative has no
way to offset the patron's share of the losses. Since the cooperative may
not be able to recover losses from terminated members, it would be forced
to recoup the loss through unallocated retained earnings.
Neither of these are viable methods for distributing losses when
other cooperatives offer more desirable alternatives. The existence of
viable alternatives may cause patrons to desert a cooperative allocating
direct billings and thereby make the probability of losses in the next
period more likely.
Allocated equity (qualified and nonqualified)
The cooperative may also handle the loss via allocated equity. Each
individual member's allocated equity accounts (either qualified or
nonqualified) may be reduced. The reduction in each patron's equity
account would be equivalent to the share of the loss generated by that
member's business with the cooperative. In this case, the members would
treat the loss allocation as an ordinary loss just as positive net
savings are treated as ordinary income when they are received as
allocated equity. The interpretation of IRS rulings upholds this method;
net losses from overall operations ... should be assessed against
patrons as a 'negative patronage dividend*..." (1, p. 399).
In contrast to the accounts receivable method, passing the loss to
the members by equity reduction allows the cooperative to recognize the
loss without waiting until the next accounting period. It also reduces
the portion of the cooperative's equity base it must retire in the
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future. Cooperatives already experiencing difficulty retiring equities
are placed in a position where an already burdensome equity retirement
liability is reduced (11).
Members are affected differently depending on whether the loss
allocation is passed through by reducing qualified equity accounts or
nonqualified equity accounts. Since the members have paid taxes on the
qualified allocations, they may reduce their taxable ordinary income by
the amount of loss received if the loss is passed in qualified form.
In the case of nonqualified allocations, the cooperative has paid
the income tax. Thus, the cooperative would receive the tax deduction.
Since the cooperative has no taxable income in the year the loss is
sustained and if the cooperative is unable to carry the tax deduction
forward, then the tax deduction becomes a deadweight loss.
Unallocated retains
The most common method for cooperatives to handle a loss is by the
reduction in unallocated retains. The cooperative holds or absorbs the
loss by reducing unallocated retained earnings from prior years. If the
loss is handled in this fashion, the member's allocated accounts are not
directly affected although total member equity decreases. The
cooperative still is responsible for retiring the remaining allocated
equity.
This method of handling losses is used by cooperatives because it is
uncomplicated and avoids potentially bad member relations. Holding the
loss in the cooperative does not require changes in allocated equity
accounts. Members experience no visible tax or equity consequences. The
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cooperative is not required to send notices. Many boards and managers
believe when members are not directly affected by the loss they are less
likely to switch cooperatives than would be the case when the loss is
received as negative patronage.
However, the need to consider alternative methods of handling losses
has arisen. It is increasingly difficult for cooperatives to hold losses
that are large, frequent, and occurring at all levels in the cooperative
system (Chapter two, p. 26).
Carrying the loss
The last method of handling a loss is the possibility of carrying
the loss forward. The loss would be carried forward to offset future net
savings. This method is technically limited to nonmember business by the
Internal Revenue Code (14). Since a majority of the cooperative's
business must be conducted by members in order for the cooperative to
maintain its exempt status, then carrying the loss does not offer a good
alternative for exempt cooperatives to handle large losses derived mostly
from member business. However, note that the members are able to carry
a loss forward or back. This allows the assumption that the member, if
passed a loss, will be in a better position to use the whole loss to
reduce tax liability.
Practical alternatives for Midwest cooperatives
The legal methods of handling losses just described are not all
practical for Midwest cooperatives in a federated system. Member-sourced
business restricts the cooperative from using the carry forward method.
Thus, the cooperative may either hold the loss within the cooperative by
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reducing unallocated retains or pass the loss to members by directly
billing members and/or reducing members allocated equity. In the
Midwest, direct billing of the loss in not a viable alternative. A
patron may readily take his/her business elsewhere. The practice of
passing the loss through nonqualified allocated equity is impractical due
to the possible loss of the tax deduction that nonqualified redemptions
are allowed. For these reasons, the most practical methods are 1)
reducing unallocated retained earnings and 2) reducing qualified
allocated equity.
The reduction of unallocated retained earnings (referred to as
holding the loss) has been expedient and economical when losses were
small and infrequent. Alternative methods of handling losises must be
considered since the losses now occurring are larger, more frequent, and
more difficult to handle with the depleted unallocated retains account.
Cooperative boards must identify the most favorable method of
distributing losses. Solutions that damage the cooperative and its
members as little as possible are most desirable. Therefore, an analysis
comparing financial and tax consequences of holding the loss with passing
the loss (reduction of qualified allocated equity) was conducted. The
analysis, using actual cooperative data, was constructed to show the
advantages and disadvantages of each.
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Quantitative Compatison
The discussion of legal loss distribution methods presented several
alternatives a cooperative (local or regional) may use when it sustains a
loss. The quantitative comparison examined two of these methods of
allocation - passing and holding. The analysis includes not only cases
where net losses occurred but also cases where positive earnings
contained hidden losses. Hidden losses occurred when the local
cooperative distributed net savings derived from either the positive
regional patronage greater than the local loss or the local savings
(gain) greater than the negative regional patronage. In order to make
the comparison complete, was necessary to analyze the various
combinations of local savings and regional patronage that might occur.
The combinations examined depended on the relative magnitude of the local
and regional earnings (when they differed in sign) and the regional's
distribution method. Figure 3.1 presents a schematic diagram showing the
distinct regional-local earnings combinations based on these factors.
To conduct a quantitative comparison between the distribution
methods of holding or passing "losses" (including hidden losses), a
cooperative accounting simulation model (CASM) and data from eight Iowa
cooperatives were used. CASM was used to project operating statements,
balance sheets, sources and uses statements, and the financial impact the
distribution method had on member net cash flows (4). Three years of
financial data for each of the eight Iowa cooperatives were used to
validate the projected statements from CASM. In all cases, projections
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approximately duplicated the actual data in the audited statement.
Selected operating statement factors for the third year were altered
so that various levels of local earnings and regional patronage (the
local cooperatives share of regional earnings) were generated. The
distribution methods for these earnings were then varied holding all
other variables constant to isolate the pure effect of the gain or loss
distribution on the cooperative and its members. Regional or local
earnings equal to zero created no unique situations. The nonzero
earnings were distributed as in the situations in Figure 3.1 but as a
relatively smaller or larger distribution. The case of zero net savings
arising from zero regional and zero local earnings assumed away the
problem altogether and therefore were not included in the analysis.
Twenty projections were used in the quantitative comparison. The 20
projections allowed comparisons of the effects of the regional
cooperative holding or passing its earnings (holding the local's
distribution method constant). Within this regional analysis the effect
of the local cooperative holding or passing its loss may also be compared
(holding the regional*s distribution method constant). The eight Iowa
cooperatives were deliberately selected to represent different levels of
earnings and different financial conditions.
The cooperatives were chosen to represent three classifications:
"financially sound" cooperatives, "high regional investment''
cooperatives, and "financially troubled" cooperatives. These
classifications were selected to gain information on how net savings and
loss distribution methods might affect cooperatives of different size and
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financial health. Appendix A contains the specific criteria used to
classify the cooperatives.
Cooperatives one and two were chosen as financially sound because
they had not sustained losses in any of the three years analyzed, their
debt-to-equity (local and total) ratios were low, and both had relatively
strong working capital positions. Cooperatives three, four, and five
were chosen as high regional investment cooperatives because their
investment-to-total-asset ratios and term-debt-to-local-equity ratios
were high. Cooperatives six, seven, and eight were chosen as financially
troubled because their earnings had gradually deteriorated from positive
net savings to negative net savings.
Both the regional and the local comparisons examined the financial
impacts the different distribution methods had on each of the eight local
cooperatives. The financial variables examined were the local
cooperative's total member equity, total assets, working capital, and
member net cash flows. The values of these variables are presented in
the tables as referenced in the text. It is important to note here that
allocated equity included both qualifieds and nonqualifieds only when the
cooperative currently distributed some portion of its positive net
savings in the form of nonqualifieds. If another method was used or if a
loss occurred allocated equity represented qualified equity only.
Also important to note is that member net cash flows are dependent on
the members' tax brackets. The computer model (CASM) used in the analysis
calculates member net cash flows under five scenarios. Each scenario has
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a different average tax bracket based on the member distribution within
the tax brackets which range from 11% to 50%. Appendix B contains the
assumptions used to determine member net cash flows for each scenario.
Comparison of regional's distribution methods
Comparisons of the regional holding or passing its net savings were
analyzed for when the regional had a loss and for when it had a gain.
Figure 3.1, shown earlier, presents the twenty projections used for
comparison. When the regional had a loss (column A of Figure 3.1), three
situations were applicable for the study of loss allocation. When the
regional had savings (a gain) (column C), only two situations were
applicable. Each of these five situations is represented by a decision
tree and tables for the eight cooperatives. The tables may be traced
through the decision tree. The decision tree outcomes (as numbered on
the right side of each figure) for each situation correspond to the order
of the columns for that situation's set of ei^ht tables. Cooperative
eight was used in each situation to express the relationships of the
financial impacts for when the regional passed its net savings compared
to when the regional held its net savings.
Regional has a loss If the regional has a loss, it may be
greater or less than local savings and local savings may be either
positive or negative. Thus, three unique situations were examined to
compare regional loss distribution methods. They are:
1) negative regional patronage refund greater than the local gain,
2) negative regional patronage refund less than the local gain, and
3) negative regional patronage refund plus a local loss.
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Tables 3.1._, 3.2._, and 3.3._ present the data for the three situations,
respectively. The blanks refer to the eight cooperatives (1-8) used in
the comparison analysis.
Regional loss situation one The situation where the
regional may distribute negative patronage greater than the local's
positive local savings can result in the local cooperative distributing
either negative or positive net savings. The actual size and sign of the
local's allocation depends on whether the regional passes or holds its
loss. If the regional held its loss the local distributed savings. If
the regional passed its loss the local distributed a loss. Figure 3.2
depicts the decision tree for this situation.
The six outcomes on the decision tree correspond to the six columns
in each of Tables 3.1.1 - 3.1.8. Columns one through four present the
values for where the regional held its loss and columns five and six
present the values for where the regional passed its loss. Comparing
similar local distribution methods (column one with five and columns two
through four with six), the following relationships were found to exist
between the regional's distribution methods.
If the regional passed negative patronage refunds greater than the
local's positive local savings, then the local distributed negative net
savings. Cooperative eight in Table 3.1.8 had negative net savings of
-$594,967 when the regional passed its loss. Under such a situation, the
local cooperative had lower member equity and total assets, higher working
capital, and higher member net cash flows than if the regional held its
loss. Had the loss been held the local cooperative could have
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distributed positive net savings of $105,033.
Member equity was lower in the comparsion due to the distribution of
negative net savings when the regional passed its loss compared to the
distribution of positive net savings when the regional held its loss.
Member equity was $1,775,100 when the regional passed its loss regardless
of the local cooperatives distribution method. Member equity ranged from
$2,438,098 to $2,458,049 when the regional held its loss. The range was
due to the different distribution methods the local cooperative could use
to distribute the positive net savings.
The difference in member equity when the regional passed or
held its loss was due to a combination of two factors. First, member
equity was smaller when the regional passed its loss because the negative
net savings decrease equity whether unallocated or allocated. Second,
member equity was smaller because when the regional held its loss the
positive net savings increased equity net payments for taxes or cash
patronage.
The total asset account was also lower in the comparison because of
the impacts the negative net savings had compared to the positive net
savings. Whether the local cooperative held its savings or passed them,
total assets were $3,598,397. This was less than the almost $4,300,000
of total assets that the local cooperative had when the regional held its
loss. The difference was due primarily to the reduction in regional
investments, but taxes or cash patronage paid out when the regional loss
was held partially offset the effect. The total asset account was
smaller when the regional passed its loss because the regional's
52
allocation decreased the investments account. However, state and federal
taxes or cash patronage paid by the local cooperative on its earnings
distribution reduced the margin of difference because the payments
reduced the working capital when the regional held its loss.
Working capital in local cooperative eight was higher when the
regional passed its loss. Working capital was $547,135 when the regional
passed its loss versus values between $510,132 and §530,083 (depending on
the local's distribution method) when the regional loss was not passed.
This occurred because the local cooperative had no cash expenditures
reducing working capital for taxes or cash patronage when it had negative
net savings. When the regional held its loss, the local cooperative had
positive net savings and paid taxes and/or cash patronage depending on
how it chose to distribute the savings.
Member net cash flows were higher when the regional passed its loss
no matter what distribution method the local cooperative used. If the
local cooperative held its net savings as unallocated retains, member net
cash flows were $15,514 when the regional passed its loss and $0 when the
regional held its loss. This difference arose due to the use of
investment tax credits (ITCs). When the regional held its loss, ITCs
were required to cover the taxes due on the unallocated retains
distribution: When the regional passed its loss, ITCs were not needed to
cover taxes on the local cooperative's negative distributions and could
be passed to members.
If the local cooperative allocated its net savings, member net cash
flows were over $200,000 when the regional passed its loss and were less
53
than §20,000 when the regional held its loss. This difference arose due
to the member's tax liability on tke qualified allocations. When the
regional held its loss, members were required to pay taxes on positive
qualified allocations. When the regional passed its loss, members
received a tax deduction from the negative qualified allocations. If
nonqualified allocated equity was used when the regional held the loss,
member net cash flows were the same as if the local had held the net
savings via unallocated retains.
Although this net cash flow relationship occurred for all eight
cooperatives, it might not necessarily hold in all cases. If the local
paid larger portions of their positive earnings as cash with large
distributions then the resulting positive net cash flow may be greater
then the net cash flows resulting from losses creating deductions to
taxable income. For example, the member net cash flows of Table 3.1.2
are larger for the regional passing its loss and the local passing the
net loss. But if the negative regional patronage refund had only been
-$500,000, the net cash flows in scenario one would be almost $33,000 and
in scenario five almost $38,000.
These cash flows are less than the net cash flows received when the
regional held the loss and the local passed its gain via qualifieds with
a 50% cash payout. Although members may receive a higher positive net
cash flow, the working capital position of the cooperative would decay
further from paying the high level of cash patronage.
The situation where the regional passed negative patronage greater
than the local gain caused local cooperative eight to have smaller levels
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of total equity and total assets, larger levels of working capital, and
larger member net cash flows compared to the regional holding its loss.
This was true for all eight of the cooperatives analyzed. The larger
member net cash flows shown in these eight cases would not necessarily
hold if higher cash payouts were made or smaller losses were experienced.
Boards would have to consider these magnitudes in each situation.
Regional loss situation two The situation where the
regional distributed negative patronage refunds less than the local's
positive savings resulted in the local cooperative distributing positive
earnings regardless of whether the regional passed or held its loss. If
the regional passed its loss, the local's positive distribution was
reduced. Figure 3.3 depicts the decision tree for this situation.
The eight outcomes on the decision tree correspond to the eight
columns in each of Tables 3.2.1 - 3.2,8. Columns one through four
present the values when the regional held its loss and columns five
through eight present the values when the regional passed its loss.
Comparing similar local distribution methods (column one with five,
column two with six, column three with seven, and column four with eight)
the following relationships were found to exist between the regional's
distribution methods.
If the regional passed negative patronage refunds less than the
local's positive savings, the local distributes positive net savings (but
at a reduced level from positive local savings). Cooperative eight in
Table 3.2.8 had net savings of $77,010 when the regional passed its loss.
Under such a situation, local cooperative eight had lower member equity
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Table 3.2.1 Allocatable local share of regional loss less than local gain
Regional's loss not passed
I^cal Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20% Cash) (50% Cash)
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 1,198,820 1,215,838 1,179,171 1,198,820
Allocated Equity 823,802 933,077 896,410 916,060
Unallocated Retains 330,975 238,718 238,718 238,718
Investments 279,827 279,827 279,827 279,827
Total Assets 1,518,156 1,535,383 1,498,716 1,518,156
Working Capital 435,908 452,926 416,259 435,908
State & Federal Tax 44,594 48 48 44,594
Cash Patronage Paid 0 27,319 63,986 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 0 0
Local Savings 137,388 137,388 137,388 137,388
Regional Patronage 0 0 0 0
Net Savings 137,388 137,388 137,388 137,388
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 369 -10,362 26,305 369
= 25% 348 -15,726 20,941 348
= 30% 339 -18,005 18,662 339
= 35% 336 -18,966 17,701 336
= 40% 321 -22,660 14,007 321
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Regional loss passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualif ie<
(20?; Cash) {50% Cash)
1,196,026 1,211,249 1,176,303 1,196,026
823,302 928,488 893,542 933,265
328,181 238,718 238,718 238,718
274,091 274,091 274,091 274,091
1,515,368 1,530,794 1,495,848 1,515,368
438,850 454,073 419,127 438,850
41,646 48 48 41,646
0 26,172 61,118 0
-5,736 -5,736 -5,736 -5,736
137,388 137,388 137,388 137,388
-5,736 -5.736- -5,736 -5,736
131,652 131,652 131,652 131,652
374 -9,724 25,222 374
352 -14,864 20,082 352
343 -17,048 17,899 343
340 -17,969 16,977 340
325 -21,509 13,437 325
Table 3.2.2 Allocatable local share of regional loss less than local gain
Regional loss not passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20% Cash) (50% Cash)
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 4,263,540 4,368,044 4,250,310 4,263,540
Allocated Equity 2,971,075 3,328,183 3,210,449 3,223,679
Unallocated Retains 1,231,905 979,301 979,301 979,301
Investments 1,390,425 1,390,425 1,390,425 1.390,425
Total Assets 5,769,615 5,874,119 5,756,385 5,769,615
Working Capital 898,333 1,002,837 885,103 898,333
State & Federal Tax 193.781 0 0 193,781
Cash Patronage Paid 0 89,277 207,011 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 0 0
Local Savings 446,386 446,386 446,386 446.386
Regional Patronage 0 0 0 0
Net Savings 446,386 446,386 446,386 446,386
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= Z0% 0 -33,450 84,284 0
- 25% 0 -50,883 66,850 0
= 30% 0 -58,289 59,445 0
= 35% 0 -61,414 56,320 0
= 40% 0 -73,421 44,312 0
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Regional loss passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20% Cash) (50% Cash)
4,252,086 4,348,762 4,238,259 4 ,252,086
2,971,075 3,308.901 3,198,398 3 ,212,226
1,220,451 979,301 979,301 979,301
1,366,322 1,366,322 1,366,322 1 ,366,322
5,758,161 5.854,836 5,744,333 5 ,758,161
910,982 1,007,658 897,155 910,982
181,132
0
-24,103
0
84,457
-24,103
0
194,-960
-24,103
181,132
0
-24,103
446,386
-24,103
422,283
446,386
-24,103
422,283
446,386
-24,103
422,283
446,386
-24,103
422,283
0 -30,770 79,733 0
0 -47.262 63,240 0
0 -54,268 56,235 0
0 -57,224 53,279 0
0 -68,583 41,920 0
Table 3.2.3 Allocatable local share! of regional loss less 'Chan local gain
Regional loss not passed
Local Local passesi gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20% Cash) (50% Cash)
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 3,699,194 3,717,065 3,679,865 3,699,195
Allocated Equity 2,177,831 2,307,615 2,270,415 2,289,744
Unallocated Retains 644,272 532,359 532,359 532,359
Investments 2,361,453 2,361,453 2,361,453 2,361,453
Total Assets 8,197,860 8,215,731 8,178,531 8,197,861
Working Capital 785,624 803,495 766,295 785,625
State & Federal Tax 50,318 0 0 50,318
Cash Patronage Paid 0 32,446 69,646 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 0 0
Local Savings 162,231 162,231 162,231 162,231
Regional Patronage 0 0 0 0
Net Savings 162,231 162,231 162,231 162,231
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 0 -6,569 30,632 0
= 25% 0 -12,904 24,296 0
= 30% 0 -15,596 21,604 0
= 35% 0 -16,731 20,469 0
= 40% 0 -21,095 16,105 0
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Regional loss passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20?; Cash) (50?; Cash)
3,653,014 3 ,645,869 3,635,368 3,653,014
2,177,831 2 ,236,419 2,225,918 2,243,564
598,092 532,359 532,359 532,359
2,272,458 2 ,272,458 2,272,458 2,272,458
8,151,680 8 ,144,535 8,134,033 8,151,680
828,439 821,294 810,793 828,439
7,503
0
-88,995
0
14,647
-88,995
0
25,149
-88,995
7,503
0
-88,995
162,231
-88,995
73,236
162,231
-88,995
73,236
162,231
-88,995
73,236
162,231
-88,995
73,236
0 3,326 13,828 0
0 466 10,968 0
0 -749 9,753 0
0 -1,262 9,240 0
0 -3,232 7,270 0
Table 3.2.4 Allocatable local share of regional loss less than local gain
Regional loss not passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20% Cash) (50% Cash)
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 2,451,491 2,449,723 2,432,619 2,451,490
Allocated Equity 1,231,221 1,297,699 1,280,595 1,299,466
Unallocated Retains 846,547 778,302 778,302 778,302
Investments 1,329,109 1,329,109 1,329,109 1,329,109
Total Assets 4,295,252 4,293.477 4,276.379 4,295,251
Working Capital 676,195 674,427 657,323 676,194
State 6t Federal Tax 14,853 0 0 14,853
Cash Patronage Paid 0 16,626 33,724 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 0 0
Local Savings 83,098 83,098 83,098 83,098
Regional Patronage 0 0 0 0
Net Savings 83,098 83,098 83,098 83,098
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 0 -1,414 15,690 0
= 25% 0 -4,659 12,445 0
= 30% 0 -6,038 11,066 0
= 35% 0 -6,620 10,485 0
= 40% 0 -8,855 8,249 0
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Regional loss passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20% Cash) (50% Cash)
2,430,829 2,424,187 2,416,659 2,430,828
1,231,221 1,272,163 1,264,635 1,278,805
825,886 778,302 778,302 778,302
1,297,189 1,297,189 1,297,189 1,297,189
4,274,590 4.267,947 4,260,419 4,274,589
687,453 .680,811 673,283 687,452
3,594 0 0 3,594
0 10,236 17,764 0
-31,920 -31,920 -31,920 -31,920
83,098 83,098 83,098 83,098
-31,920 -31,920 -31,920 -31,920
51,178 51,178 51,178 51,178
10 2,135 9,663 10
10 136 7,665 10
10 -713 6,816 10
10 -1,071 6,547 10
10 -2,448 5,081 10
Table 3.2.5 Allocatable local share of regional loss less than local gain
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity
Allocated Equity
Unallocated Retains
Investments
Total Assets
Working Capital
State & Federal Tax
Cash Patronage Paid
Reg Noncash Refunds
Local Savings
Regional Patronage
Net Savings
Member Net Cash Flow;
Average Tax Bracket
= 20%
= 25%
= 30%
= 35%
= 40%
Regional loss not passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds
(20% Cash) (50% Cash)
14,388,463 14,314,639
6,856,952 6,783,128
5,065,148 5,065,148
5,946,078 5,946,078
14,325,378
6,419,528
5,439,487
5,946,078
30,873,456
4,822,960
172,440
0
0
546,781
0
546,781
11,508
11,508
11,508
11,508
11,508
30,936,548 30,862,734
4,886,048 4,812,224
0
109,356
0
546,781
0
546,781
40,924
19,569
10,498
6,671
-8,037
0
183,180
0
546,781
0
546,781
114,748
93,393
84,322
80,495
65,787
Nonqualifieds
14,325,379
6,793,869
5,065,148
5,946,078
30,873,456
4,822,960
172,440
0
0
546,781
0
546,781
11,508
11,508
11,508
11,508
11,508
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Regional loss passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20?; Cash) (50?; Cash)
14,213,073 14,199,398 14,196,473 14,213,074
6,419,528 6,667,387 6,664,962 6,681,564
5,327,182 5,065,148 5,065,148 5,065,148
5,709,746 5,709,746 5,709,746 5 ,709,746
30,761,152 30,747,478 30,744.554 30,761,152
4,946,992 4,933,312 4,930,400 4,946,992
48,413
0
-236,332
0
62,090
-236,332
0
65,014
-236,332
48,413
0
-236,332
546,781
-236,332
310,449
546,781
-236,332
310,449
546,781
-236,332
310,449
546,781
-236,332
310,449
11,508 67,200 70,125 11,508
11,508 55,076 58,000 11,508
11,508 49,926 52,850 11,508
11,508 47,752 50,677 11,508
11,508 39,401 42,326 11,508
Table 3.2.6 Allocatable local share of regional loss less than local gain
Regional loss not passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifiec
C20% Cash) (50% Cash)
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 1,550,311 1,582,315 1,531,542 1,550,311
Allocated Equity 757,655 919,422 868,649 887,418
Unallocated Retains 685,277 555,514 555,514 555,514
Investments 1,023,660 1,023,660 1,023,660 1,023,660
Total Assets 3,055,738 3.087,741 3,036.968 3,055,738
Working Capital 548,427 580,431 529,658 548,427
State St Federal Tax 72,446 0 0 72,446
Cash Patronage Paid 0 40,442 91,215 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 0 0
Local Savings 202.209 202,209 202,209 202,209
Regional Patronage 0 0 0 0
Net Savings 202,209 202,209 202,209 202,209
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 0 -12,593 38,180 0
= 25% 0 -20,490 30,283 0
= 30% 0 -23,845 26,928 0
= 35% 0 -25,261 25,513 0
= 40% 0 -30,700 20,074 0
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Regional loss passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds N'onqualif ieds
(20®; Cash) (50% Cash)
1,504,397 1,506,785 1,484,335 1,504,397
757,655 843,892 821,422 841,504
639,363 555,514 555,514 555,514
929,247 929,247 929,247 929,247
3,009,824 3,012,211 2,989,761 3,009,824
596,926 599,314 576,864 596,926
23,947
0
-94,413
0
21,559
-94,413
0
44,009
-94,413
23,947
0
-94,413
202,209
-94,413
107,796
202,209
-94,413
107,796
202,209
-94,413
107,796
202,209
-94,413
107,796
0 -2,096 20,354 0
0 -6,306 16,144 0
0 -8,094 14,356 0
0 -8,849 13,601 0
0 -11,748 10,701 0
Table 3.2.7 Allocacable local shareI of regional loss less 1than local gain
Regional loss not passed
Local Local passes; gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20% Cash) (50% Cash)
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 2 ,793,455 2,819,700 2,774,331 2,793,455
Allocated Equity 1 .652,014 1,884,357 1,748,168 1,858,112
Unallocated Retains 1 ,050,621 935,343 935,343 935,343
Investments 1 ,478,534 1,478,534 1,478,534 1,478,534
Total Assets 6 ,427,369 6,453,613 6,408,245 6,427,369
Working Capital 856,149 882,394 837,025 856,149
State fit Federal Tax 61,626 0 0 61,626
Cash Patronage Paid 0 35,381 80,749 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 0 0
Local Savings 176,904 176,904 176,904 176,904
Regional Patronage 0 0 0 0
Net Savings 176,904 176,904 176,904 176,904
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 0 -11,966 33,402 0
= 25% 0 -18,875 26,493 0
« 30% 0 -21,810 23,558 0
= 35% 0 -23,048 22,320 0
= 40% 0 -27,807 17,561 0
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Regional loss passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20% Cash) (50% Cash)
23 757,612 2 ,761,114 2,737,715 2 ,757,612
1. 742,833 1 ,825,771 1,802,372 1 ,822,269
1. 014,779 935,343 935,343 935,343
1, 405,302 1 ,405,302 1,405,302 1 .405,302
6. 391,526 6 ,395,028 6,371,629 6 ,391,526
893,538 897,040 873,641 893,538
24,236 0 0 24,236
0 20,734 44,133 0
-73,232 -73,232 -73,232 -73,232
176,904 176,904 176,904 176,904
-73,232 -73,232 -73,232 -73,232
103,672 103,672 103,672 103,672
0 -3,824 19,574 0
0 -7,873 15,526 0
0 -9,593 13,806 0^
0 -10,319 13,080 0
0 -13,107 10,291 0
Table 3.2.8 Allocatable local share of regional loss less than local gain
Regional loss not passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
C20% Cash) (50% Cash)
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 2,458,049 2,454,094 2,438,098 2,458,049
Allocated Equity 1,400,476 1,484,502 1,468,506 1,488,457
Unallocated Retains 623,046 535,065 535,065 535,065
Investments 875,603 875,603 875,603 875,603
Total Assets 4,281,346 4,277.390 4,261,394 4,281,346
Working Capital 530,083 526,128 510,132 530,083
State Federal Tax 17,052 0 0 17,052
Cash Patronage Paid 0 21,007 37,003 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 0 0
Local Savings 105,033 105,033 105,033 105,033
Regional Patronage 0 0 0 0
Net Savings 105,033 105,033 105,033 105,033
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20Z 0 3,836 19,831 0
= 25% 0 -267 15,729 0
= 30% 0 -2,009 13,987 0
= 35% 0 -2.744 13,252 0
= 40% 0 -5,570 10,426 0
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Regional loss passed
Local Local passes gain via:
holds gain Qualifieds Qualifieds Nonqualifieds
(20?; Cash) (50% Cash)
2,441,417 2,431,676 2,424,086 2,441,417
1,400,476 1,462,084 1,454,494 1,471,825
606,414 535,065 535,065 535,065
847,580 847,850 847,580 847,580
4,264,714 4,254,972 4,247,383 4,264,714
541,474 531,733 524,143 541,474
5,661 0 0 5,661
0 15,402 22,991 0
-28,023 -28,023 -28,023 -28,023
105,033 105,033 105,033 105,033
-28,023 -28,023 -28,023 -28,023
77,010 77,010 77,010 77,010
859 6,951 14,540 859
859 3,944 11,533 859
859 2,666 10,255 859
859 2,127 9,716 859
859 55 7 ,644 859
72
and total assets, higher working capital, and higher or lower member net
cash flows (depending on local's distribution method) than if the
regional had held its loss. Failure of the regional to pass the loss
would have caused the local cooperative to distribute net savings of
$105,033.
Member equity was lower when the regional passed its loss due to the
smaller net savings. The magnitude of the difference in member equity
depended on the local cooperative's distribution method. If the local
cooperative held the net savings, member equity was $2,441,417 when the
regional passed its loss. This was lower than the $2,458,049 of equity
that the local cooperative had when the regional held its loss. The
difference was due to the amount of net savings (net of taxes) that the
cooperative distributed to unallocated retains. If the local cooperative
passed the net savings, this same relationship held. Member equity was
smaller (when the regional passed its less) by the difference in the
amount of net savings (net of taxes and/or cash patronage) that the
cooperative distributed as qualified and/or nonqualified equity.
The total asset account was also lower when the regional passed its
loss. This result was due to the smaller earnings and reduction in
investments. Again the absolute level of the difference depended on the
local cooperative's distribution method. If the local cooperative held
the net savings, the total asset account was $4,264,714 when the regional
passed its loss and $4,281,346 when the regional held its loss. The
difference was due mainly to the decrease in the investments account and
was partially offset by the smaller use of working capital funds for
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taxes.
If the local cooperative passed the net savings to members, the same
relationship held. The total asset account was smaller when the regional
passed its loss by the amount the negative regional patronage decreased
the investment account net the amount it reduced working capital funds
required to pay taxes or cash patronage (due to smaller earnings).
Working capital of the local cooperative, as implied above, was
higher when the regional passed its loss. This occurred because the
cooperative used less working capital for taxes or cash patronage when
the regional's loss allocation reduced local savings and the local's
distribution method was held constant. For example, if local cooperative
eight passed its net savings of $77,010 (after recognizing the regional's
loss allocation) using qualified allocated equity at a 50% cash patronage
payout, the requirements from working capital funds were $22,991. When
the regional held its loss, net savings of $105,033 required $37,003 of
working capital to achieve the 50% cash payout. Note that ITCs were used
to replace cash patronage dollars above the 20% minimum required on
qualified allocations. ITCs may be used in this way up to the amount of
ITCs available ($15,514 within cooperative eight) when no taxation at the
cooperative level occurred.
Member net cash flows were higher or lower for cooperative eight
(assuming the regional passed its loss) depending on the distribution
method selected by the local. If the local cooperative distributed its
net savings via unallocated retains, qualified equity with 20% cash
payout or nonqualified equity, the member net cash flows were higher when
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the regional passed its loss. If the local cooperative distributed its
net savings via qualified equity with 50% cash, the member net cash flows
were lower when the regional passed its loss.
In the cases for unallocated retains and nonqualified distributions,
the local cooperative was required by law to apply available ITCs to pay
the taxes due on these distributions. Where all the ITCs were used this
way member net cash flows were zero. When the regional passed its loss
net savings were reduced and as a consequence a smaller fractiion of ITCs
were required to offset tax on local distributions to unallocated retains
or nonqualifieds. Member net cash flows were therefore greater than zero
by the portion of ITCs no longer needed to cover the reduced tax
liability.
In the cases for qualified equity, the impact of the regional's
distribution method depended on the level of cash patronage paid. At a
low cash payout (20%), the negative regional patronage passed decreased
the distribution which decreased the negative net cash flow. This was
advantageous to the members. At a high cash payout (50%), the decreased
distribution caused a decreased positive net cash flow, which was
disadvantageous to the members. It should be noted that the local
cooperative itself had a better working capital position at the lower
cash payout.
The situation where the regional passed negative patronage less than
the local's positive local savings caused local cooperative eight to have
smaller levels of member equity and total assets, larger levels of
working capital, and member net cash flows that varied depending on the
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local's distribution method as compared to the alternative where the
regional held its loss. These relationships were true for all eight of
the cooperatives analyzed.
Regional loss situation three The situation where both the
regional and the local cooperative sustained losses resulted in the local
distributing negative net savings regardless of whether the regional
passed or held its loss. If the regional passed its loss, the local's
negative distribution was increased. Figure 3.4 depicts the decision
tree for this situation.
The four outcomes on the decision tree correspond to the four
columns in each of Tables 3.3.1 - 3.3.8. Columns one and two present the
values when the regional held its loss and columns three and four
present the values when the regional passed its loss. Comparing
similar local distribution methods (column one with three and column two
with four) the following relationships were found to exist between the
regional's distribution methods.
If the regional passed negative patronage and the local sustained a
loss also, the local distributed negative net savings of higher absolute
value than the existing negative local savings. Cooperative eight in
Table 3.3.8 had negative net savings of -$95,282 when the regional passed
its loss. Under such a situation, the local cooperative had lower member
equity and total assets, equal working capital, and equal or higher
member net cash flows than when the regional held its loss. If the
regional loss was held, the local cooperative distributed negative net
savings of -$67,259.
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Table 3.3.1 Allocatable local share of regional loss with a local loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity
Allocated Equity
Unallocated Retains
Investments
Total Assets
Working Capital
State 5e Federal Tax
Cash Patronage Paid
Reg Noncash Refunds
Local Savings
Regional Patronage
Net Savings
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20%
= 25%
= 30%
= 35%
= 40%
Regional loss not passed
Local Local
holds loss passes loss
1,077,665
823,802
209,820
279,827
1,397,258
314,753
0
0
0
-28,104
0
-28,104
4,970
4,939
4,925
4,920
4,899
1,077,665
794,904
238,718
279,827
1,397,099
314,753
160
0
0
-28,104
0
-28,104
9,429
10,533
11,002
11.200
11,960
Regional loss passed
Local Local
holds loss passes loss
1,071,929
823,802
204,084
274,091
1,391,522
314,753
0
0
-5,736
-28,104
-5,736
-33,840
4,971
4,939
4,925
4,920
4,899
1,071,929
789,168
238,718
274,091
1,391,363
314,753
160
0
-5,736
-28,104
-5,736
-33,840
11,214
12,542
13,106
13,344
14,259
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Table 3.3.2 Allocatable local share of regional loss with a local loss
Regional loss not passed Regional los s passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity- 3,873,852 3,873,852 3,849,749 3,849,749
Allocated Equity 2,971,075 2,833,991 2,971,075 2,809,888
Unallocated Retains 842,217 979,301 818,114 979,301
Investments 1,390,425 1,390,425 1,366,322 1,366,322
Total Assets 5,379,927 5,379,927 5,355,824 5,355,824
Working Capital 508,645 508,645 508,645 508,645
State 6t Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg N'oncash Refund 0 0 -24,103 -24,103
Local Savings -137,084 -137,084 -137,084 -137,084
Regional Patronage 0 0 -24,103 -24,103
Net Savings -137,084 -137,084 -161,187 -161,187
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 16,182 58,840 16,182 66,341
= 25", 16,182 64,194 16,182 72,636
= 30^ 16,182 66,468 16,182 75,310
= 35% 16,182 67,428 16,182 76,438
= 40% 16,182 71,115 16,182 80,774
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Table 3.3.3 Allocatable local share of regional loss with a local loss
Regional loss not passed Regional loss passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 3,085,301 3,085,302 2,996,306 2,996,307
Allocated Equity 2,177,830 1,675,852 2,177,830 1.586,857
Unallocated Retains 30,380 532,359 -58,615 532,359
Investments 2,361,453 2,361,453 2,272,458 2,272,458
Total Assets 7,583,967 7,583,968 7,494,972 7,494,973
Working Capital 171,731 171,732 171,731 171,732
State 5t Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 -88,995 -88,995
Local Savings -501,979 -501,979 -501,979 -501,979
Regional Patronage 0 0 -88,995 -88,995
Net Savings -501,979 -501,979 -590 ,974 -590,974
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 11,469 167,677 11,469 195,371
= 25% 11,469 187,282 11,469 218,451
= 30% 11,469 195,610 11,469 228,256
= 35% 11,469 199,123 11,469 232,393
= 40% 11,469 212,627 11,469 248,290
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Table 3.3.4 Allocatable local share of regional loss with a local loss
Regional loss not passed Regional loss passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 2,261,992 2,261,992 2,230,072 2,230,072
Allocated Equity 1,231,221 1,109,968 1,231,221 1,078,048
Unallocated Retains 657,049 778,302 625,129 778,302
Investments 1,329,109 1,329,109 1,297,189 1,297,189
Total Assets 4,105,753 4,105,753 4,073,833 4,073,833
Working Capital 486,696 486,696 486,696 486,696
State St Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg N'oncash Refunds 0 0 -31,920 -31,920
Local Savings -121,253 -121,253 -121,253 -121,253
Regional Patronage 0 0 -31,920 -31,920
Net Savings -121,253 -121,253 -153,173 -153,173
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 7,825 45,557 7,825 55,490
= 25% 7,825 50,293 7,825 61,472
= 30?; 7,825 52,304 7,825 64,014
= 35?; 7,825 53,153 7,825 65 ,086
= 40% 7,825 56,415 7,825 69,206
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Table 3.3.5 Allocacable local share of resional loss with a local loss
Regional loss not passed Regional loss passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 12,231,444 12,231,444 11,995,112 11,995,112
Allocated Equity 6,419,527 4,699,933 6,419,527 4,463,601
Unallocated Retains 3,345,554 5,065,148 3,109,222 5,065,148
Investments 5,946,078 5,946,078 5,709,746 5,709,746
Total Assets 28,779,520 28,779,520 28,543,200 28,543,200
Working Capital 2,729,024 2,729,024 2,729,040 2,729,040
State 6c Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 -236,332 -236,332
Local Savings -1,719,595 -1,719,595 -1,719,595 -1,719,595
Regional Patronage 0 0 -236,332 -236,332
Net Savings -1,955,927 -1,955,927 -1,719,595 -1,719,595
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20°; 101,718 636,829 101,718 710,372
= 25% 101,718 703,988 101,718 786,761
= 30% 101,718 732,516 101,718 819,210
= 35% 101,718 744,553 101,718 832,901
= 40% 101,718 790,810 101,718 885 ,516
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Table 3.3.6 Allocatable local share of regional loss with a local loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity
Regional loss not passed
Local Local
holds loss passes loss
1,081,163 1,081,163
Regional loss passed
Local Local
holds loss passes loss
986,750 986,750
Allocated Equity 757,655 418,270 757,655 323,857
Unallocated Retains 216,129 555,514 121,716 555 ,514
Investments 1,023,660 1,023,660 929,247 929,247
Total Assets 2.586,590 2,586,590 2,492,177 2,492,177
Working Capital 79,279 79,279 79,279 79,279
State Federal Tax
Cash Patronage Paid
Reg Noncash Refunds
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-94,413
0
0
-94,413
Local Savings
Regional Patronage
Net Savings
-339,385
0
-339,385
-339,385
0
-339,385
-339,385
-94,413
-433,798
-339,385
-94,413
-433,798
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20%
= 25%
= 30%
= 35%
= 40%
9,889
9,889
9,889
9 ,889
9,889
115,500
128,755
134,386
136,761
145,891
9,889
9,889
9,389
9,889
9,889
144,880
161,822
169,019
172,056
183,725
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Table 3.3.7 Allocatable local share of regional loss with a local loss
Regional loss not passed Regional loss passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 2,098,091 2,098,092 2,024,859 2,024,859
Allocated Equity 1,652,013 1,162,749 1,742,833 1,089,517
Unallocated Retains 355,258 935,343 282,026 935,343
Investments 1,478,534 1,478,534 1,405,302 1,405,302
Total Assets 5,732,005 5,732,006 5 ,658,773 5 ,658,773
Working Capital 160,786 160,786 160,786 160,786
State & Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 -73,232 -73,232
Local Savings -580,085 -580,085 -580,085 -580,085
Regional Patronage 0 0 -73,232 -73,232
Net Savings • -580,085 -580,085 -653,317 -653,317
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 7,703 188,216 7,703 211,005
= 25% 7,703 210,871 7,703 236,520
= 30% 7,703 220,495 7,703 247,359
= 35% 7,703 224,556 7,703 251,932
= 40% 7,703 240,160 7,703 269,506
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Table 3.3.8 Aliocatable local share of regional loss with a local loss
Regional loss not passed Regional loss passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 2,302,809 2,302,809 2,274,786 2,274,786
Allocated Equity 1,400,476 1,333,217 1,400,476 1,305,194
Unallocated Retains 467,806 535,065 439,783 535,065
Investments 875,603 875,603 847,580 847,580
Total Assets 4,126,106 4,126,106 4,098,083 4,098,083
Working Capital 374,843 374,843 374,843 374,843
State &. Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg N'oncash Refunds 0 0 -28,023 -28,023
Local Savings -67,259 -67,259 -67,259 -67,259
Regional Patronage 0 0 -28,023 -28,023
Net Savings -67,259 -67,259 -95,282 -95,282
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 15,514 36,444 15,514 45,164
= 25% 15,514 39,070 15,514 48,885
= 30% 15,514 40,186 15,514 50,466
= 35% 15,514 40,657 15,514 51,133
= 40% 15,514 42,466 15,514 53,696
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Member equity was lower when the regional passed its loss and was
identical between local distribution methods. Member equity was
$2,274,786 when the regional passed its loss versus $2,302,809 when the
regional held its loss. If the local cooperative held the negative net
savings by reducing unallocated retains, member equity was lower due to
the larger negative distribution that decreased that account. If the
local cooperative passed its negative net savings, member equity was
lower due to the larger negative distribution that decreased allocated
equity.
The total asset account was lower when the regional passed its loss
and was identical between local distribution methods. Total assets were
$4,098,083 when the regional passed its loss and were $4,126,106 when the
regional held its loss. Whether the local cooperative held or passed its
net savings, the total assets account was lower by the amount of the
negative regional allocation that decreased the investment account.
Working capital of cooperative eight was unaffected by the regional
decision to pass or hold its loss whether the local passed the loss or
held it by reducing unallocated retains. Working capital was $374,843
for each of the four outcomes of this situation.
Member net cash flows were equal or higher (when the regional passed
its loss) for cooperative eight depending on the distribution method
selected by the local. If the local cooperative held its negative net
savings, the member net cash flows were equal at a value of $15,514
whether the regional held or passed its loss. This was due to the
$15,514 of ITCs passed to members. If the local cooperative passed its
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negative net savings, the member net cash flows were higher when the
regional passed its loss. This was due to the extra tax deduction from
the increased negative distribution the local passed when the regional
loss was included.
The situation where the regional passed negative savings in addition
to the local's negative local savings caused cooperative eight to have
smaller levels of member equity and total assets, equal levels of working
capital, and equal or higher member net cash flows as compared to the
alternative where the regional held its loss. These relationships held
for all eight of the cooperatives analyzed.
Summary of regional loss situations The relationships
presented for each of the three regional loss situations were generally
consistent. All three situations showed smaller levels of member equity
and total assets when the regional passed its loss. Working capital was
higher (situations one and two) or unaffected (situation three) when the
regional passed its loss compared to when the regional losses were held.
The impact of the regional's distribution on member net cash flows was
ambiguous depending on the local cooperative's distribution method.
These general relationships when the regional sustained a loss were
consistent regardless of the variability in net savings among the eight
cooperatives or in the differences in the balance sheets among the three
classifications.
Regional has a gain If the regional has positive savings (a
gain), the positive regional patronage may be greater or less than the
absolute level of local savings which may be positive or negative.
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Although three unique situations were possible only the first two were
examined. The third situation (column C situation 3 of Figure 3.1) of a
regional gain and a local gain contained no losses and was not considered
relevent to a study concerning loss allocation. The two situations
examined to compare the regional passing its gain versus holding its gain
are:
1) positive regional patronage refund less than the local loss and
2) positive regional patronage refund greater than the local loss.
Tables 3.4._ and 3.5._ present the data for the two situations,
respectively. Again the blanks refer to the cooperatives (1-8) used in
the comparison.
Regional gain situation one The situation where the
regional distributed positive patronage refunds less than the local's loss
resulted in the local cooperative distributing negative net savings
regardless of whether the regional passed or held its savings (gain). If
the regional passed its savings, the local's negative distribution was
reduced. Figure 3.5 depicts the decision tree for this situation.
The four outcomes on the decision tree correspond to the four
columns in each of Tables 3.4.1 -3.4.8. Columns one and two present the
values when the regional held its gain and columns three and four
present the values when the regional passed its gain. Comparing
similar local distribution methods (column one with three and column two
with four) the following relationships were found to exist between the
regional's distribution methods.
If the regional passed a positive refund less than the local's
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Table 3.4.1 Allocatable local share of regional gain less than local loss
Regional gain not passed Regional ga in passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 1,077,665 1,077,665 1,083,401 1,083,401
Allocated Equity 823,802 794,904 823,802 800,640
Unallocated Retains 209,820 238,718 215,556 238,718
Investments 279,827 279,827 284,329 284,329
Total Assets 1,397,258 1,397,099 1,402,994 1,402,835
Working Capital 314,753 314,753 315,987 315,987
State 5c Federal Tax 0 160 0 160
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 4,502 4,502
Local Savings -28,104 -28,104 -28,104 -28,104
Regional Patronage 0 0 5,736 5,736
Net Savings -28,104 -28,104 -22,368 -22,368
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 4,970 9,429 4,970 7,644
= 25% 4,939 10,533 4,939 8,524
= 30% 4,925 11,002 4,925 8,898
= 35% 4,920 11,200 4,920 9,055
= 40% 4,899 11,960 4,899 9,661
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Table 3.4.2 Allocatable local share of regional gain less than local loss
Regional gain not passed Regional gain passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 3,873,852 3,873,852 3,897,955 3,897,955
Allocated Equity 2,971,075 2,833,991 2,971,075 2,858,094
Unallocated Retains 842,217 979,301 866,320 979,301
Investments 1,390,425 1,390,425 1,404,665 1,404,665
Total Assets 5,379,927 5,379,927 5,404,030 5,404,030
Working Capital 508,645 508,645 518,508 518,508
Staue & Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 14,240 14,240
Local Savings -137,084 -137,084 -137,084 -137,084
Regional Patronage 0 0 24, 103 24,103
Net Savings -137,084 -137,084 -112,981 -112,981
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 16,182 58,840 16,182 51,340
= 25^0 16,182 64,194 16,182 55,752
= 30% 16,182 66,468 16,182 57,626
= 35% 16,182 67,428 16,182 58,417
= 40% 16,182 71,115 16,182 61,457
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Table 3,4.3 Allocatable local share of regional gain less than local loss
Regional gain not passed Regional gain passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 3,085,301 3,085,302 3,174,297 3,174,297
Allocated Equity 2,177,830 1,675,852 2,177,831 1,764,847
Unallocated Retains 30,380 532,359 119,375 532,359
Investments 2,361,453 2,361,453 2,408,673 2.408,673
Total Assets 7,583,967 7,583,968 7,672,963 7,672.963
Working Capital 171.731 171,732 213,507 213,507
State & Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 47,221 47,221
Local Savings -501,979 -501,979 -501,979 -501,979
Regional Patronage 0 0 88,995 88,995
Net Savings -501,979 -501,979 -412.984 -412,984
Member Net Cash Flow: -
Average Tax Bracket
= 20?; 11,469 167,677 11,469 139,983
= 25% 11,469 187,282 11,469 156,112
= 30% 11,469 195,610 11,469 162,964
= 35% 11,469 199,123 11,469 165 ,855
= 40% 11,469 212,627 11,469 176,964
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Table 3.4.4 Allocatable local share of regional gain less then local loss
Regional gain not passed Regional gain passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 2,261,992 2,261,992 2,293,912 2.293,912
Allocated Equity 1,231,221 1,109,968 1,231,221 1,141,888
Unallocated Retains 657,049 778,302 688,969 778,302
Investments 1,329,109 1,329,109 1,346,032 1,346,032
Total Assets 4,105,753 4,105,753 4,137,673 4,137,673
Working Capital 486,696 486,696 501,693 501,693
State & Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 16,924 16,924
Local Savings -121,253 -121,253 -121,253 -121,253
Regional Patronage 0 0 31,920 31,920
Net Savings -121,253 -121,253 -89,333 -89,333
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20?; 7,825 45,557 7,825 35,624
= 25?; 7,825 50,293 7,825 39,113
= 30% 7,825 52,304 7,825 40,595
= 35?; 7.825 53,153 7,825 41,221
= 40% 7,825 56,415 7,825 43,624
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Table 3.4.5 Allocatable local share of regional gain less than local loss
Regional gain not passed Regional gain passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 12,231.444 12,231,444 12,467,776 12,467,776
Allocated Equity 6,419,527 4,699,933 6,419,527 4,936,265
Unallocated Retains 3,345,554 5,065,143 3,581,886 5,065,148
Investments 5,946,078 5,946,078 6,135,143 6,135,143
Total Assets 28,779,520 28,779,520 29,015,856 29,015,856
Working Capital 2,729,024 2,729,024 2,776,288 2, 776 ,288
State 5c Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 189,066 189,066
Local Savings -1,719,595 -1,719,595 -1,719,595 -1,719,595
Regional Patronage 0 0 236,332 236,332
Net Savings -1,955,927 -1,955,927 -1,483,263 -1,483,263
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20?; 101,718 636,829 101,718 563,286
= 25% 101,718 703,988 101,718 621,215
= 30% 101,718 732,516 101,718 645,322
= 35?; 101,718 744,553 101,718 656,205
= 40?; 101,718 790,810 101,718 696,105
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Table 3.4.6 Allocacable local share of regional gain less than local loss
Regional gain not passed Regional gain passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss ]passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives;
Total Member Equity 1,081,163 1,081,163 1,175,576 1,175,576
Allocated Equity 757,655 418,270 757,655 512,683
Unallocated Retains 216,129 555,514 301,542 555 ,514
Investments 1,023,660 1,023,660 1,042,543 1,042,543
Total Assets 2,586,590 2,586 ,590 2,681,003 2.681,003
Working Capital 79,279 79,279 154,809 154,809
State 5c Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 18,883 18,883
Local Savings -339,385 -339,385 -339,385 -339,385
Regional Patronage 0 0 94,413 94,413
Net Savings -339,385 -339,385 -244,972 -244,972
Member Net Cash Flow:
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 9,889 115,500 9,889 86,121
= 25% 9,889 128,755 9,889 95,688
= 30% 9,889 134,386 9,889 99,752
= 25% 9,889 136,761 9,889 101,467
= U0% 9,889 145,891 9,889 108,057
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Table 3.4.7 Allocatable local share of regional gain less than local loss
Regional gain not passed Regional gain passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 2,098,091 2,098,092 2,171,323 2,171,324
Allocated Equity 1,652,013 ^ 1,162,749 1,742,833 1,235,981
L'nallocated Retains 355,258 935,343 428,490 935,343
Investments 1,478,534 1,478,534 1,548,104 1,548,104
Total Assets 5,732,005 5,732,006 5,805,237 5,805,238
Working Capital 160,786 160,786 164,447 164,448
State St Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 69,570 69,570
Local Savings -580,085 -580,085 -580,085 -580,085
Regional Patronage 0 0 73,232 73,232
Net Savings -580,085 -580,085 -506,853 -506,853
Member Net Cash Flow;
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 7,703 188,216 7,703 165,427
= 25% 7,703 210,871 7,703 185,222
= 30% 7,703 220,495 7,703 193,631
= 35% 7,703 224,556 7,703 197,179
= 40% 7,703 240,160 7,703 210,814
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Table 3.4.8 Allocatable local share of regional gain less than local loss
Regional gain not passed Regional gain passed
Local Local Local Local
holds loss passes loss holds loss passes loss
Local Cooperatives:
Total Member Equity 2,302,809 2,302,809 2,330,832 2,330,832
Allocated Equity 1,400,476 1,333,217 1,400,476 1,361,240
Unallocated Retains 467,806 535,065 495,829 535 ,065
Investments 875,603 875,603 903,626 903,626
Total Assets 4,126,106 4,126,106 4,154,129 4,154,129
Working Capital 374,843 374,843 374,843 374,843
State & Federal Tax 0 0 0 0
Cash Patronage Paid 0 0 0 0
Reg Noncash Refunds 0 0 28,023 28,023
Local Savings -67,259 -67,259 -67,259 -67,259
Regional Patronage 0 0 28,023 28,023
Net Savings -67,259 -67,259 -39,236 -39,236
Member Net Cash Flow;
Average Tax Bracket
= 20% 15,514 36,444 15,514 27,723
= 25?; 15,514 39,070 15,514 29,256
= 30% 15,514 40,186 15,514 29,907
= 35% 15,514 40,657 15,514 30,181
= 40% 15,514 42,466 15,514 31,237
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negative local savings, the local distributed negative net savings (but
at a reduced level from negative local savings). Cooperative eight in
Table 3.4.8 had net savings of -$39,236 when the regional passed its
savings. Under such a situation, the local cooperative had higher member
equity and total assets, equal working capital, and equal or lower member
net cash flows.
Member equity was higher when the regional passed its savings due to
the smaller negative net savings. Member equity was $2,330,832 when the
regional passed its savings and was $2,302,809 when the regional held its
savings. These values of member equity occurred whether the local
cooperative passed or held its negative net savings. If the local held
its negative net savings, member equity was higher due to the reduced
negative local distribution that decreased unallocated retains. If the
local passed its negative net savings, member equity was higher due to
the reduced magnitude of the local's negative distribution that decreased
the allocated equity account.
The total asset account was also higher due to the reduced negative
net savings the local distributed when the regional passed its savings.
Total assets was $4,154,129 when the regional passed its savings and
$4,126,106 when the regional held its savings. These values for total
assets occurred whether the local cooperative passed or held its negative
net savings. The total asset account was higher by the amount the
positive regional patronage increased the investment account (the noncash
portion) and increased the working capital account (the cash portion).
Working captial for cooperative eight was unaffected by the
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regional's distribution method at $374,843. Cooperative eight, however,
presents a unique case. The regional's positive allocation was all in
the form of noncash which would be the case of a nonqualified allocation.
If $1 of cash had been passed working capital would be higher and if
qualifieds were used at least 20% must be in the form of cash. Thus in
general, working capital will be higher when the regional passes its
savings and will be increased by the amount of the cash portion the
regional allocated. This held regardless of the local's distribution
method because there were no taxes or cash patronage paid when negative
net savings occurred. These are the usual sources of variation triggered
by the local distribution method used.
Cooperative eight's member net cash flows were equal or lower when
the regional passed its savings depending on the distribution method
selected by the local. When the local cooperative held the negative net
savings, member net cash flows were $15,514 (from ITCs passed) whether
the regional held or passed its savings. If the local cooperative passed
the negative net savings, member net cash flows were positive due to the
reduction in tax liability created by the negative distributions, as well
as the ITCs passed. When the regional passed its savings, member net cash
flows were lower because the absolute levels of the negative distribution
were reduced: This in turn reduced the effect on member's tax liability.
The situation where the regional passed positive patronage less than
the local's negative local savings caused local cooperative eight to have
higher levels of member equity and total assets, equal levels of working
capital, and equal or lower member net cash flows. As found in the
99
working capital section and the other seven cooperatives, the situation
usually caused higher levels of working capital so long as the regional's
allocation was made partly in cash. The other relationships held for all
eight of the cooperatives analyzed.
Regional gain situation two The situation where the
regional distributed a positive refund greater than the local's loss
resulted in the local cooperative distributing either positive or
negative earnings. The sign of net savings passed depended on whether
the regional passed or held its savings. If the regional passed its
savings, the local distributed positive net savings. If the regional
held its savings, the local distributed negative net savings. Figure 3.6
depicts the decision tree for this situation.
The six outcomes on the decision tree correspond to the six columns
in each of Tables 3.5.1 - 3.S.8. Columns one and two present the values
when the regional held its gain and columns three through si:: present
the values when the regional passed its gain. Comparing similar
local distribution methods (column one with three and column two with
four through six) the following relationships were found to exist between
the regional's distribution methods.
If the regional passed positive patronage greater than the
local's negative local savings, then the local distributed positive net
savings. Cooperative eight in Table 3.5.8 had net savings of $632,741
when the regional passed its savings. Under such a situation, local
cooperative eight had higher member equity and total assets, higher or
lower working capital accounts (depending on the distribution method
P
o
s
it
iv
e
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
g
re
a
te
r-
th
a
n
l
o
c
a
l
lo
s
s
-R
eg
io
n
al
ga
in
_
n
o
t
p
a
ss
e
d
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
-p
a
ss
e
d
-L
o
c
a
l
lo
s
s
h
e
ld
(1
)
-L
o
ca
l
lo
ss
p
a
ss
e
d
(2
)
-N
et
g
a
in
h
e
ld
(3
)
-N
et
g
a
in
p
as
se
d
-
-Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
w
it
h
20
%
c
a
sh
(4
)
-Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
w
it
h
50
%
c
a
sh
(5
)
-N
o
n
q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
(6
)
F
ig
u
re
3
i6
E
ar
n
in
g
s
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
u
tc
o
m
es
d
er
iv
ed
fr
om
th
e
a
lt
e
rn
a
ti
v
e
d
e
c
is
io
n
(s
)
on
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
m
et
ho
d
un
de
r
th
e
as
su
m
pt
io
n
th
e
re
g
io
n
al
's
sa
vi
ng
s
al
lo
ca
ti
o
n
is
g
re
at
er
th
an
th
e
lo
ca
l
lo
ss
g
e
n
e
ra
te
d
o o
T
ab
le
3
.5
.1
A
tl
o
c
a
ta
b
le
lo
c
a
l
sh
a
re
o
f
re
g
io
n
a
l
g
ai
n
g
re
a
te
r
th
an
th
e
lo
c
a
l
lo
ss
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
n
o
t
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
l
p
a
ss
e
s
g
a
in
v
ia
:
-
h
o
ld
s
l
o
s
s
p
a
s
s
e
s
lo
s
s
h
o
ld
s
g
a
in
Q
ii
a
li
fi
e
d
s
Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
N
o
n
q
u
a
li
fl
e
d
s
L
o
c
a
l
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
s
:
T
o
ta
l
M
em
be
r
E
q
u
it
y
1
,0
7
7
,6
6
5
1
.0
7
7
,6
6
5
1
,4
5
4
,1
6
0
(2
0
%
C
a
sh
)
1
,6
4
3
,4
4
4
(5
0
%
C
a
sh
)
1
,4
4
6
,4
2
5
1
,4
5
4
,1
6
0
A
1
lo
c
a
te
d
E
q
u
it
y
8
2
3
,8
0
2
7
9
4
,9
0
4
8
2
3
,8
0
2
1
,3
6
0
,6
8
3
1
,1
6
3
,6
6
4
1
,1
7
1
,3
9
9
U
n
a
ll
o
c
a
te
d
R
e
ta
in
s
2
0
9
,8
2
0
2
3
8
,7
1
8
5
8
6
,3
1
5
2
3
8
,7
1
8
2
3
8
,7
1
8
2
3
8
.7
1
8
I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
2
7
9
.8
2
7
2
7
9
,8
2
7
8
2
9
,2
5
7
8
2
9
,2
5
7
8
2
9
,2
5
7
8
2
9
,2
5
7
T
o
ta
l
A
s
s
e
ts
1
,3
9
7
,2
5
8
1
,3
9
7
,0
9
9
1
,7
7
3
,3
7
1
1
,9
6
2
,9
8
9
1
.7
6
5
.9
7
1
1
,7
7
3
,3
7
1
W
o
rk
in
g
C
a
p
it
a
l
3
1
4
,7
5
3
3
1
4
,7
5
3
1
4
1
,8
1
9
3
3
1
,1
0
3
1
3
4
,0
8
4
1
4
1
,8
1
9
S
t
a
t
e
&
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
T
a
x
C
as
h
I'
aL
ro
ii
ag
e
P
a
id
R
eg
N
o
n
cc
is
lj
R
e
fu
n
d
0 0 0
1
6
0 0 0
3
2
3
,8
8
8 0
5
4
9
,4
3
0
4
8
1
3
4
,2
2
1
5
4
9
,4
3
0
4
8
3
3
1
,2
4
0
5
4
9
,4
3
0
3
2
3
,8
8
8 0
5
4
9
,4
3
0
li
O
ca
l
S
a
v
in
g
s
R
(i
g
io
n
a]
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
N
o
t
S
a
v
in
g
s
-2
8
,1
0
4 0
-2
8
,1
0
4
-2
8
,1
0
4 0
-2
8
,1
0
4
-2
8
,1
0
4
7
0
0
,0
0
0
6
7
1
,8
9
6
-2
8
,1
0
4
7
0
0
,0
0
0
6
7
1
,8
9
6
-2
8
,1
0
4
7
0
0
,0
0
0
6
7
1
,8
9
6
-2
8
,1
0
4
7
0
0
,0
0
0
6
7
1
,8
9
6
M
o
m
b
cr
N
e
t
C
a
sh
F
lo
w
:
A
v
e
ra
g
e
T
ax
B
ra
c
k
e
t
=
2
i
a
=
2
5
%
=
3
0
%
=
3
5
%
=
4
0
%
4
,9
7
0
4
,9
3
9
4
,9
2
5
4
,9
2
0
4
,8
9
9
9
,4
2
9
1
0
,5
3
3
1
1
,0
0
2
11
,2
0
0
1
1
,9
6
0
2
8
3
2
6
7
2
6
0
2
5
7
2
4
6
-6
9
,7
9
1
-9
6
,0
3
0
-1
0
7
,1
7
6
-1
1
1
,8
7
9
-1
2
9
,9
5
2
1
2
7
,2
2
8
1
0
0
.9
8
9
8
9
,8
4
3
8
5
,
1
4
0
6
7
,0
6
7
2
8
3
2
6
7
2
6
0
2
5
7
2
4
6
T
ab
le
3.
5.
2
A
llo
ca
L
ab
lo
lo
ca
l
sh
ar
e
of
re
gi
on
al
ga
in
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
th
e
lo
ca
l
lo
ss
R
eg
io
n
al
g
a
in
n
o
t
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
h
o
ld
s
lo
ss
p
a
ss
e
s
lo
ss
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
l
p
as
se
s
g
a
in
v
ia
:
h
o
ld
s
g
ai
n
Q
u
al
if
ie
d
s
Q
u
al
if
ie
d
s
N
o
n
q
u
al
if
ie
d
s
(2
0%
C
as
h
)
(5
0%
C
as
h)
L
o
ca
I
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
s:
T
o
ta
l
M
em
be
r
E
q
u
it
y
3
,8
7
3
.8
5
2
3
,8
7
3
,8
5
2
4
.3
1
8
,9
1
5
4
.4
6
1
,2
6
8
4
,3
0
8
,5
7
5
4
,3
1
8
.9
1
5
A
ll
o
c
a
te
d
E
q
u
it
y
2
.9
7
1
,0
7
5
2
,8
3
3
,9
9
1
2
.9
7
1
.0
7
5
3
,4
2
1
,4
0
7
3
,2
6
8
,7
1
4
3
,2
7
9
,0
5
5
U
n
a
ll
o
c
a
te
d
R
e
ta
in
s
8
4
2
,2
1
7
9
7
9
,3
0
1
1
.2
8
7
,2
8
0
9
7
9
.3
0
1
9
7
9
.3
0
1
9
7
9
,3
0
1
I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
1
,3
9
0
,4
2
5
1
,3
9
0
,4
2
5
1
.8
0
3
.9
8
4
1
.8
0
3
,9
8
4
1
,8
0
3
,9
8
4
1
,8
0
3
.9
8
4
T
o
ta
l
A
s
s
e
ts
5
,3
7
9
,9
2
7
5
,3
7
9
.9
2
7
5
.8
2
4
.9
9
0
5
.9
6
7
,3
4
3
5
,8
1
4
.6
5
0
5
.8
2
4
.9
9
0
W
o
rk
in
g
C
a
p
it
a
l
5
0
8
,6
4
5
5
0
8
.6
4
5
5
4
0
.1
4
9
6
8
2
,5
0
2
5
2
9
,8
0
9
5
4
0
.1
4
9
S
ta
te
&
F
e
d
e
ra
l
T
a
x
C
as
li
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
P
a
id
R
eg
N
o
n
c
a
sh
R
e
fu
n
d
0 0 0
0 0 0
2
5
4
.9
3
7 0
4
1
3
,5
6
0
0
1
1
2
,5
8
3
4
1
3
.5
6
0
0
2
6
5
,2
7
6
4
1
3
,5
6
0
2
5
4
,9
3
7 0
4
1
3
.5
6
0
L
o
ca
l
S
a
v
in
g
s
R
eg
io
n
al
P
at
ro
n
ag
e
N
et
S
a
v
in
g
s
-1
3
7
,0
8
4 0
-1
3
7
.0
8
4
-1
3
7
,0
8
4 0
-1
3
7
,0
8
4
-1
3
7
.0
8
4
7
0
0
,0
0
0
5
6
2
,9
1
6
-1
3
7
,0
8
4
7
0
0
,0
0
0
5
6
2
,9
1
6
-1
3
7
,0
8
4
7
0
0
,0
0
0
5
6
2
,9
1
6
-1
3
7
,0
8
4
7
0
0
.0
0
0
5
6
2
.9
1
6
M
em
b
er
N
et
C
as
li
F
lo
w
:
A
v
e
ra
g
e
T
ax
B
ra
c
k
e
t
=
2
0
%
=
2
5
%
=
3
0
%
=
3
5
%
=
4
0
%
1
6
,1
8
2
1
6
,
1
8
2
1
6
,1
8
2
1
6
,1
8
2
1
6
,1
8
2
5
8
,8
4
0
6
4
.1
9
4
6
6
,4
6
8
6
7
,4
2
8
71
,
1
1
5
0 0 0 0 0
-4
6
,4
0
6
-6
8
,3
9
1
-7
7
,7
2
9
-8
1
,6
7
0
-9
6
.8
1
2
1
0
6
,2
8
6
8
4
,3
2
0
7
4
,9
6
3
71
,0
2
3
5
5
,8
8
0
0 0 0 0 0
o N
3
T
ab
le
3
.5
.3
A
ll
o
cn
ta
b
le
lo
ca
l
sh
ar
e
o
f
re
g
io
n
al
g
ai
n
g
re
at
er
th
an
th
e
lo
ca
l
lo
ss
L
o
ca
l
C
o
o
p
c
ra
ti
v
e
s:
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
n
o
t
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
h
o
ld
s
lo
ss
p
a
ss
e
s
lo
ss
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
l
p
a
ss
e
s
g
a
in
v
ia
:
li
o
ld
s
g
a
in
Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
N
o
n
q
u
al
if
le
d
s
(2
0%
C
a
sh
)
(5
0%
C
as
h
)
T
o
ta
l
M
em
be
r
E
q
u
it
y
3
,0
8
5
,3
0
1
3
,0
8
5
,3
0
2
3
,7
1
6
,5
8
8
3
,7
4
5
.6
9
7
3
,6
9
7
,7
6
0
3
,7
1
6
,5
8
9
A
ll
o
c
a
te
d
E
q
u
it
y
2
,1
7
7
,8
3
0
1
,6
7
5
,8
5
2
2
,1
7
7
,8
3
1
2
,3
3
6
,2
4
7
2
,2
8
8
,3
1
0
2
,3
0
7
,1
3
8
U
n
a
ll
o
c
a
te
d
R
e
ta
in
s
3
0
,3
8
0
5
3
2
,3
5
9
6
6
1
.6
6
6
5
3
2
,3
5
9
5
3
2
,3
5
9
5
3
2
,3
5
9
I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
2
,3
6
1
,4
5
3
2
,3
6
1
,4
5
3
2
,7
3
2
,8
7
3
2
,7
3
2
,8
7
3
2
,7
3
2
,8
7
3
2
,7
3
2
,8
7
3
T
o
ta
l
A
s
s
e
ts
7
,5
8
3
,9
6
7
7
,5
8
3
,9
6
8
8
,2
1
5
,2
5
4
8
,2
4
4
,3
6
3
8
,1
9
6
,3
8
6
8
,2
1
5
,2
5
5
W
o
rk
in
g
C
ap
i
ta
l
1
7
1
,7
3
1
1
7
1
,7
3
2
4
3
1
,5
9
8
4
6
0
,7
0
7
4
1
2
,7
7
0
4
3
1
,5
9
9
S
ta
te
fi
t
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
T
a
x
0
0
6
8
,7
1
4
0
0
6
8
,7
1
4
C
a
sh
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
P
a
id
0
0
0
3
9
,6
0
4
8
7
,5
8
1
0
R
eg
N
o
n
c
a
sh
R
e
fu
n
d
0
0
3
7
1
,2
4
0
3
7
1
,2
4
0
3
7
1
,2
4
0
3
7
1
,2
4
0
L
o
c
a
l
S
a
v
in
g
s
-5
0
1
,9
7
9
-5
0
1
,9
7
9
-5
0
1
,9
7
9
-5
0
1
,9
7
9
-5
0
1
,9
7
9
-5
0
1
,9
7
9
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
0
0
7
0
0
,0
0
0
7
0
0
,0
0
0
7
0
0
,0
0
0
7
0
0
,0
0
0
N
et
S
a
v
in
g
s
-5
0
1
.9
7
9
-5
0
1
,9
7
9
1
9
8
,0
2
1
1
9
8
,0
2
1
1
9
8
,0
2
1
1
9
8
,0
2
1
M
e
m
b
e
r
N
e
t
C
a
s
h
F
lo
w
:
A
v
e
ra
g
e
T
ax
B
ra
c
k
e
t
=
2
0
%
1
!
,4
6
9
1
6
7
,6
7
7
0
-1
0
,5
4
8
3
7
,3
8
9
0
=
2
5
%
1
1
,4
6
9
1
8
7
,2
8
2
0
-1
8
,2
8
2
2
9
,6
5
6
0
=
3
0
%
1
1
,4
6
9
1
9
5
,6
1
0
0
-2
1
,5
6
7
2
6
,3
7
1
0
=
3
5
%
1
1
,4
6
9
1
9
9
,
1
2
3
0
-2
2
,9
5
3
2
4
,9
8
4
0
=
4
0
%
1
1
,4
6
9
2
1
2
,6
2
7
0
-2
8
,2
8
0
1
9
,6
5
8
0
o u
>
T
ab
le
3
.5
.4
A
ll
o
ca
ta
b
le
lo
ca
l
sh
ar
e
o
f
re
g
io
n
al
g
ai
n
g
re
a
te
r
th
an
th
e
lo
ca
l
lo
ss
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
n
o
t
p
a
ss
e
d
i.
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
m
a
s
s
e
s
i>
/
h
o
ld
s
lo
s
s
p
a
s
s
e
s
lo
s
s
ii
o
ld
s
g
a
in
Q
u
a
li
f
ie
d
s
Q
u
a
li
fi
c
d
s
N
o
n
q
u
a
ll
fi
e
d
s
L
o
c
a
l
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
s:
T
o
ta
l
M
em
be
r
E
q
u
it
y
2
,2
6
1
,9
9
2
2
,2
6
1
,9
9
2
2
,6
9
0
,3
9
1
(2
0%
C
a
sh
)
2
,8
4
6
,2
4
2
(5
0%
C
a
sh
)
2
,6
8
0
,4
4
3
2
,6
9
0
,3
9
0
A
ll
o
c
a
te
d
E
q
u
it
y
1
.2
3
1
.2
2
1
1
.1
0
9
,9
6
8
1
,2
3
1
,2
2
1
1
,6
9
4
,2
1
8
1
,5
2
8
,4
1
9
1
,5
3
8
,3
6
7
U
n
a
ll
o
c
a
te
d
R
e
ta
in
s
6
5
7
,0
4
9
7
7
8
,3
0
2
1
,0
8
5
,4
4
7
7
7
8
,3
0
2
7
7
8
,3
0
2
7
7
8
,3
0
2
I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
1
.3
2
9
,1
0
9
1
,3
2
9
,1
0
9
1
,7
0
0
,2
4
9
1
,7
0
0
,2
4
9
1
,7
0
0
,2
4
9
1
,7
0
0
,2
4
9
T
o
ta
l
A
s
s
e
ts
4
,1
0
5
,7
5
3
4
,1
0
5
.7
5
3
4
,5
3
4
,1
5
2
4
,6
9
0
.0
0
3
4
.5
2
4
,2
0
4
4
,5
3
4
,1
5
1
W
o
rk
in
g
C
a
p
it
a
l
4
8
6
,6
9
6
4
8
6
,6
9
6
5
4
3
,9
5
5
6
9
9
,8
0
6
5
3
4
,0
0
7
5
4
3
,9
5
4
S
t
a
t
e
6t
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
T
a
x
C
as
h
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
P
a
id
R
eg
N
o
n
c
a
sh
R
e
fu
n
d
0 0 0
0 0 0
2
7
1
,6
0
1 0
3
7
1
,1
4
0
0
1
1
5
,7
4
9
3
7
1
,1
4
0
0
2
8
1
,5
4
8
3
7
1
,1
4
0
2
7
1
,6
0
1 0
3
7
1
,1
4
0
L
o
c
a
l
S
a
v
in
g
s
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
N
e
t
S
a
v
in
g
s
-1
2
1
,2
5
3 0
-1
2
1
,2
5
3
-1
2
1
,2
5
3 0
-1
2
1
,2
5
3
-1
2
1
,2
5
3
7
0
0
,0
0
0
5
7
8
,7
4
7
-1
2
1
,2
5
3
7
0
0
,0
0
0
5
7
8
,7
4
7
-1
2
1
,2
5
3
7
0
0
,0
0
0
5
7
8
,7
4
7
-1
2
1
.2
5
3
7
0
0
,0
0
0
5
7
8
,7
4
7
M
e
m
b
e
r
N
e
t
C
a
sh
F
lo
w
;
A
v
e
ra
g
e
T
ax
B
ra
c
k
e
t
=
2
0
%
=
2
5
%
=
3
0
%
=
3
5
%
=
4
0
%
7
,8
2
5
7
,8
2
5
7
,8
2
5
7
,8
2
5
7
,8
2
5
4
5
,5
5
7
5
0
,2
9
3
5
2
,3
0
4
5
3
,1
5
3
5
6
,4
1
5
0 0 0 0 0
-5
6
,5
2
3
-7
9
,
1
2
6
-8
8
,7
2
7
-9
2
,7
7
8
-1
0
8
,3
4
7
1
0
9
,2
7
6
8
6
,6
7
3
7
7
,0
7
2
7
3
,0
2
0
5
7
,4
5
2
0 0 0 0 0
o 4
?
-
T
ab
le
3
.5
.5
A
ll
o
ca
ta
b
le
lo
ca
l
sh
ar
e
o
f
re
g
io
n
al
g
ai
n
g
re
a
te
r
th
an
th
e
lo
ca
l
lo
ss
L
o
c
a
l
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
s:
R
n
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
n
o
t
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
h
o
ld
s
lo
ss
p
a
ss
e
s
lo
s
s
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
p
a
ss
e
s
h
o
ld
s
g
a
in
Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
Q
ii
a
li
fi
e
d
s
(2
0
%
C
a
sh
)
(5
0%
C
a
sh
)
N
o
n
q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
T
o
ta
l
M
em
be
r
E
q
u
it
y
1
2
,2
3
1
,4
4
4
1
2
,2
3
1
,4
4
4
1
4
.1
9
8
,7
9
6
1
4
,1
7
5
,3
6
3
1
4
.1
7
5
,3
6
3
1
4
,1
9
8
,7
9
7
A
ll
o
c
a
te
d
E
q
u
it
y
6
.4
1
9
,5
2
7
4
,6
9
9
.9
3
3
6
,4
1
9
,5
2
8
6
,6
4
3
,8
5
2
6
.6
4
3
,8
5
2
6
,6
6
7
,2
8
7
U
n
a
ll
o
c
a
te
d
R
e
ta
in
s
3
,3
4
5
.5
5
4
5
,0
6
5
,1
4
8
5
,3
1
2
.9
0
5
5
,0
6
5
,1
4
8
5
,0
6
5
,1
4
8
5
,0
6
5
,1
4
8
I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
5
,9
4
6
,0
7
8
5
,9
4
6
,0
7
8
7
.5
4
6
.0
7
7
7
.5
4
6
.0
7
7
7
,5
4
6
,0
7
7
7
,5
4
6
,0
7
7
T
o
ta
l
A
s
s
e
ts
2
8
,7
7
9
,5
2
0
2
8
,7
7
9
,5
2
0
3
0
,7
4
6
,8
8
0
3
0
,7
2
3
,4
3
9
iO
,7
2
3
.4
3
9
3
0
,7
4
6
,8
8
0
W
o
rk
in
g
C
a
p
it
a
l
2
,7
2
9
,0
2
4
2
,7
2
9
,0
2
4
3
,0
9
6
,3
8
4
3
.0
7
2
,9
4
4
3
,0
7
2
,9
4
4
3
,0
9
6
,3
8
4
S
ta
te
&
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
T
a
x
0
0
3
2
.6
4
6
0
0
3
2
,6
4
6
C
as
h
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
P
a
id
0
0
0
5
6
,0
8
1
5
6
,0
8
1
0
R
eg
N
o
n
c
a
sh
R
e
fu
n
d
s
0
0
1
»
5
9
9
,9
9
9
1
,3
9
^
#
,9
9
9
1
,5
9
9
,9
^
9
1
,5
9
9
,9
9
9
L
o
c
a
l
S
a
v
in
g
s
-1
,7
1
9
,5
9
5
-1
,7
1
9
,5
9
5
-
1
,7
1
9
,5
9
5
-1
,7
1
9
,5
9
5
-
1
,7
1
9
,5
9
5
-1
,7
1
9
,5
9
5
R
eg
io
n
al
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
0
0
2
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
N
et
S
a
v
in
g
s
-1
.9
5
5
.9
2
7
-1
.9
5
5
,9
2
7
2
8
0
,4
0
5
2
8
0
,4
0
5
2
8
0
,4
0
5
2
8
0
,4
0
5
M
e
m
b
e
r
N
e
t
C
a
sh
F
lo
w
:
A
v
e
ra
g
e
T
ax
B
ra
c
k
e
t
=
2
0
%
1
0
1
,7
1
8
6
3
6
,6
2
9
1
1
,5
0
8
7
0
,5
4
1
7
0
,5
4
0
11
,5
0
8
=
2
5
%
1
0
1
,7
1
8
7
0
3
.9
8
8
1
1
,5
0
8
5
9
,5
9
0
5
9
,5
8
9
1
1
,5
0
8
=
3
0
%
1
0
1
,7
1
8
7
3
2
,5
1
6
1
1
,5
0
8
5
4
,9
3
8
5
4
,9
3
7
11
,5
0
8
=
3
5
%
1
0
1
,7
1
8
7
4
4
,5
5
3
1
1
,5
0
8
5
2
,9
7
5
5
2
,9
7
4
1
1
,5
0
8
=
4
0
%
1
0
1
,7
1
8
7
9
0
,8
1
0
1
1
,5
0
8
4
5
,4
3
2
4
5
,4
3
1
1
1
,5
0
8
o L
n
T
ab
le
3
.5
.6
A
ll
oc
at
ab
le
lo
ca
l
sh
ar
e
of
re
gi
on
al
ga
in
g
re
at
er
Ll
ia
n
Ll
ie
lo
ca
l
lo
ss
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
n
o
t
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
R
eg
io
n
al
's
g
ai
n
p
as
se
d
Ij
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
o
a
s
s
e
s
a
a
ii
h
o
ld
s
lo
s
s
p
a
s
s
e
s
lo
s
s
h
o
ld
s
g
a
in
Q
u
a
li
fi
o
d
s
Q
u
a
li
fi
c
d
s
N
o
n
q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
L
o
ca
l
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
s:
T
o
ta
l
M
em
be
r
E
q
u
it
y
1
,0
8
1
,1
6
3
1
,0
8
1
,1
6
3
1
.6
2
6
,1
0
2
(2
0%
C
a
sh
)
1
,7
0
9
,0
3
9
(5
0%
C
a
sh
)
1
,6
1
0
,7
4
4
1
,6
2
6
,1
0
1
A
ll
o
c
a
te
d
E
q
u
it
y
7
5
7
,6
5
5
4
1
8
,2
7
0
7
5
7
,6
5
5
1
,0
4
6
,1
4
7
9
4
7
,8
5
2
9
6
3
,2
0
9
U
n
a
ll
o
c
a
te
d
R
e
ta
in
s
2
1
6
,1
2
9
5
5
5
,5
1
4
7
6
1
,0
6
7
5
5
5
,5
1
4
5
5
5
,5
1
4
5
5
5
,5
1
4
I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
1
,0
2
3
,6
6
0
1
,0
2
3
,6
6
0
1
,4
4
3
,6
5
9
1
,4
4
3
,6
5
9
1
,4
4
3
,6
5
9
1
,4
4
3
,6
5
9
T
o
ta
l
A
s
s
e
ts
2
,5
8
6
,5
9
0
2
,5
8
6
,5
9
0
3
,1
3
1
,5
2
9
3
.2
1
4
,4
6
5
3
,1
1
6
,1
7
0
3
,1
3
1
,5
2
8
W
o
rk
in
g
C
a
p
it
a
l
7
9
»
2
7
9
7
9
,2
7
9
2
0
4
,2
1
9
2
8
7
,1
5
6
1
8
8
,8
6
1
2
0
4
,2
1
8
S
ta
te
fit
F
e
d
e
ra
l
T
a
x
C
as
h
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
P
a
id
R
e
g
N
o
n
c
a
sh
R
e
fu
n
d
s
0 0 0
0 0 0
1
5
5
,0
6
1 0
4
2
0
,0
0
0
0
7
2
,
1
2
3
4
2
0
,0
0
0
0
1
7
0
,4
1
8
4
2
0
.0
0
0
1
5
5
,0
6
1 0
4
2
0
,0
0
0
L
o
ca
l
S
a
v
in
g
s
R
eg
io
n
al
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
N
et
S
a
v
in
g
s
-3
3
9
,3
8
5 0
-3
3
9
,3
8
5
-3
3
9
,3
8
5 0
-3
3
9
,3
8
5
-3
3
9
,3
8
5
7
0
0
,0
0
0
3
6
0
,6
1
5
-3
3
9
,3
8
5
7
0
0
,0
0
0
3
6
0
,6
1
5
-3
3
9
,3
8
5
7
0
0
,0
0
0
3
6
0
,6
1
5
-3
3
9
,3
8
5
7
0
0
,0
0
0
3
6
0
,6
1
5
M
em
b
er
N
e
t
C
a
sl
j
F
lo
w
:
A
v
e
ra
g
e
T
a
x
B
ra
c
k
e
t
=
2
0
7
.
=
2
5
%
=
3
0
"^
=
3
5
%
=
4
0
%
9
,8
8
9
9
,8
8
9
9
,8
8
9
9
,8
8
9
9
,8
8
9
1
1
5
,5
0
0
1
2
8
,7
5
5
1
3
4
,3
8
6
1
3
6
,7
6
1
1
4
5
,8
9
1
0 0 0 0 0
-3
0
,2
0
6
-4
4
,2
8
9
-5
0
,2
7
2
-5
2
,7
9
6
-6
2
,4
9
7
6
8
,0
9
0
5
4
,0
0
6
4
8
,0
2
3
4
5
,4
9
9
3
5
,7
9
8
0 0 0 0 0
o O
N
T
ab
le
3
.5
.7
A
ll
o
ca
ta
b
le
lo
ca
l
sh
ar
e
o
f
re
gi
on
al
ga
in
g
re
at
er
th
an
th
e
lo
ca
l
lo
s!
R
eg
io
n
al
g
a
in
n
o
t
p
a
ss
e
d
L
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
h
o
ld
s
lo
ss
p
a
ss
e
s
lo
ss
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
g
a
in
pa
ss
(5
d
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
l
p
a
ss
e
s
g
a
in
v
ia
:
h
o
ld
s
g
a
in
Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
N
o
n
q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
L
o
ca
l
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
s:
(2
0%
C
a
sh
)
(5
0
%
C
a
sh
)
T
o
ta
l
M
em
be
r
E
q
u
it
y
2
,0
9
8
,0
9
1
2
,0
9
8
,0
9
2
2
,7
6
5
,7
5
8
2
,7
7
4
,1
0
9
2
,7
4
5
,8
3
7
2
,7
6
5
,7
5
8
A
ll
o
c
a
te
d
E
q
u
it
y
1
,6
5
2
,0
1
3
1
,1
6
2
,7
4
9
1
,6
5
2
,0
1
4
1
,7
4
7
,9
4
6
]
,7
1
9
,6
7
4
1
,7
3
9
,5
9
5
U
n
a
ll
o
c
a
te
d
R
e
ta
in
s
3
5
5
,2
5
8
9
3
5
,3
4
3
1
,0
2
2
,6
2
4
9
3
5
,3
4
3
9
3
5
,3
4
3
9
3
5
,3
4
3
I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
1
,4
7
8
,5
3
4
1
,4
7
8
,5
3
4
1
,8
9
8
,5
3
3
1
,8
9
8
,5
3
3
1
,8
9
8
,5
3
3
1
,8
9
8
,5
3
3
T
o
ta
l
A
s
s
e
ts
5
,7
3
2
,0
0
5
5
,7
3
2
,0
0
6
6
,3
9
9
,6
7
2
6
.4
0
8
,0
2
2
6
,3
7
9
.7
5
0
6
,3
9
9
,6
7
2
W
o
rk
in
g
C
a
p
it
a
l
1
6
0
,7
8
6
1
6
0
,7
8
6
4
0
8
,4
5
3
4
1
6
,8
0
4
3
8
8
,5
3
2
4
0
8
,4
5
3
S
ta
te
&
F
e
d
e
ra
l
T
a
x
C
as
h
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
P
a
id
R
e
g
N
o
n
c
a
sh
R
e
fu
n
d
s
0 0 0
0 0 0
3
2
,3
3
4 0
4
2
0
,0
0
0
0
2
3
,9
8
3
4
2
0
,0
0
0
0
5
2
,2
5
5
4
2
0
,0
0
0
3
2
,3
3
4 0
4
2
0
,0
0
0
L
o
c
a
l
S
a
v
in
g
s
R
e
g
io
n
a
l
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
N
et
S
a
v
in
g
s
-5
8
0
,0
8
5 0
-5
8
0
.0
8
5
-5
8
0
,0
8
5 0
-5
8
0
,0
8
5
-5
8
0
,0
8
5
7
0
0
,0
0
0
1
1
9
,9
1
5
-5
8
0
,0
8
5
7
0
0
,0
0
0
1
1
9
,9
1
5
-5
8
0
,0
8
5
7
0
0
,0
0
0
1
1
9
,9
1
5
-5
8
0
,0
8
5
7
0
0
,0
0
0
1
1
9
,9
1
5
M
em
b
er
N
e
t
C
a
sh
F
lo
w
:
A
v
e
ra
g
e
T
ax
B
ra
c
k
e
t
=
2
0
%
=
2
5
%
=
3
0
%
=
3
5
%
=
4
0
%
7
,7
0
3
7
.7
0
3
7
,7
0
3
7
,7
0
3
7
,7
0
3
1
8
8
,2
1
6
2
1
0
,8
7
1
2
2
0
,4
9
5
2
2
4
,5
5
6
2
4
0
,1
6
0
0 0 0 0 0
-5
,6
0
3
-1
0
,3
1
3
-1
2
,3
0
3
-1
3
,1
4
2
-1
6
,3
6
8
2
2
,6
4
1
1
7
,9
5
8
1
5
,9
6
9
1
5
,1
2
9
1
1
,9
0
4
0 0 0 0 0
o
T
ab
le
3
.5
.8
A1
lo
ca
la
b
le
lo
ca
l
sh
ar
e
o
f
re
g
io
n
al
g
ai
n
g
re
at
er
th
an
th
e
lo
ca
l
lo
ss
R
eg
io
n
al
g
a
in
n
o
t
p
as
se
d
L
o
c
a
l
L
o
c
a
l
h
o
ld
s
lo
ss
p
a
ss
e
s
lo
ss
R
eg
io
n
al
's
g
ai
n
p
as
se
d
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
l
p
a
ss
e
s
g
a
in
v
ia
:
h
o
ld
s
g
a
in
Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
Q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
s
N
o
n
q
u
a
li
fi
e
d
L
o
ca
1
C
o
o
p
e
ra
t
iv
e
s
:
T
o
ta
l
M
em
be
r
E
q
u
it
y
2
,3
0
2
,8
0
9
2
,3
0
2
,8
0
9
2
,7
1
0
,5
6
0
(2
0%
C
as
h
)
2
,8
7
6
.2
6
0
(5
0%
C
a
sh
)
2
,7
0
1
,9
5
2
2
,7
1
0
.5
6
0
A
ll
o
c
a
te
d
E
q
u
it
y
1
,4
0
0
,4
7
6
1
,3
3
3
,2
1
7
1
,4
0
0
,4
7
6
1
,9
0
6
,6
6
8
1
,7
3
2
,3
6
0
1
,7
4
0
,9
6
8
U
n
a
ll
o
c
a
te
d
R
e
ta
in
s
4
6
7
,8
0
6
5
3
5
,0
6
5
8
7
5
,5
5
7
5
3
5
,0
6
5
5
3
5
,0
6
5
5
3
5
,0
6
5
I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
8
7
5
,6
0
3
8
7
5
,6
0
3
1
,4
3
5
,6
0
2
1
,4
3
5
,6
0
2
1
,4
3
5
,6
0
2
1
,4
3
5
,6
0
2
T
o
ta
l
A
s
s
e
ts
4
,1
2
6
,1
0
6
4
,1
2
6
,1
0
6
4
,5
3
3
,8
5
7
4
,6
9
9
,5
5
7
4
.5
2
5
,2
4
8
4
,5
3
3
,8
5
7
W
o
rk
in
g
C
a
p
it
a
l
3
7
4
,8
4
3
3
7
4
,8
4
3
2
2
2
,5
9
4
3
8
8
,2
9
4
2
1
3
,9
8
6
2
2
2
,5
9
4
S
ta
te
&
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
T
a
x
C
a
sh
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
P
a
id
R
eg
N
o
n
c
a
sh
R
e
fu
n
d
s
0 0 0
0 0 0
2
9
2
.2
4
9 0
5
6
0
,0
0
0
0
1
2
6
.5
4
8
5
6
0
,0
0
0
0
3
0
0
,8
5
7
5
6
0
,0
0
0
2
9
2
,2
4
9 0
5
6
0
,0
0
0
L
o
c
a
l
S
a
v
in
g
s
R
eg
io
n
a1
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
N
e
t
S
a
v
in
g
s
-6
7
,2
5
9 0
-6
7
,2
5
9
-6
7
,2
5
9 0
-6
7
,2
5
9
-6
7
,2
5
9
7
0
0
,0
0
0
6
3
2
,7
4
1
-6
7
,2
5
9
7
0
0
,0
0
0
6
3
2
,7
4
1
-6
7
,2
5
9
7
0
0
,0
0
0
6
3
2
,7
4
1
-6
7
,2
5
9
7
0
0
,0
0
0
6
3
2
,7
4
1
M
em
b
er
N
e
t
C
a
sh
F
lo
w
:
A
v
e
ra
g
e
T
ax
B
ra
c
k
e
t
=
2
0
%
=
2
5
%
=
3
0
%
=
3
5
%
=
4
0
%
1
5
,5
1
4
1
5
,5
1
4
1
5
,5
1
4
1
5
,5
1
4
1
5
,5
1
4
3
6
,4
4
4
3
9
,0
7
0
4
0
,1
8
6
4
0
,6
5
7
4
2
,4
6
6
0 0 0 0 0
-5
4
,8
3
8
-7
9
,5
4
9
-9
0
,0
4
6
-9
4
,4
7
6
-1
1
1
,4
9
6
1
1
9
,4
7
0
9
4
,7
5
8
8
4
,2
6
1
7
9
,8
3
2
6
2
,8
1
2
0 0 0 0 0
o 0
0
109
selected by the local), and higher or lower member net cash flows (again
depending on the local's distribution method).
Member equity was higher when the regional passed positive savings
due to the effect the positive net savings had versus the effect negative
net savings had when the regional held its savings. If local cooperative
eight held its net savings, member equity was $2,710,560 when the
regional passed its savings but only $2,302,809 when the regional held
its savings. Member equity was larger, in this case, due to the increase
in unallocated retains (net of taxes) from the positive distribution as
compared to the decrease in unallocated retains from the negative
distribution (when the regional held its gain).
If the local cooperative passed its net savings, member equity fell
in a range from $2,701,952 to $2,876,260 depending on the local's
distribution method when the regional passed positive net savings.
However, member equity was only $2,302,809 when the regional held its
savings. Member equity was larger, in this case, due to the increase in
allocated equity (net of cash patronage for qualified allocations and net
of taxes for nonqualified allocations) from the positive distribution.
It was smaller when the regional held its savings due to the decrease in
allocated equity from the negative distribution.
The total asset account was also larger when the regional passed its
savings. The effect of the positive net savings (when the regional
passed its savings) created higher total assets than the negative net
savings which occurred when the regional held its savings. If local
cooperative eight held its net savings, the total asset account was
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$4,533,857 assuming the regional passed its savings. This is compared
with $4,126,106 of total assets assuming the regional held its savings.
The difference was partly due to the increase in the investment account
from the noncash portion of the regional patronage. The net effect on
working capital between the payment of taxes and the cash portion
received from the regional's allocation accounted for the remaining
difference.
If the local passed its positive net savings created by the
regional*s positive allocation, the total asset account was again larger
due to the effects of the investments and working capital accounts. The
investment account increased total assets due to its increase from the
noncash portion of regional's allocation. The cash portion of the
regional's allocation increases total assets via the increase in working
capital but net the payments of taxes and/or cash patronage paid. Using
local cooperative eight's distribution of qualifieds at 50% cash as an
example, the difference between $4,525,248 (when the regional passed its
savings) and $4,126,106 (when the regional held its savings) may be
explained. The noncash portion of the regional allocation was $560,000
and the cash portion was $140,000. No taxes were paid on qualified
allocations but $300,857 were paid as cash refunds. Since the use of
working capital funds for cash refunds was greater than the source of
working capital funds (cash portion of regional allocation), the net
effect ($160,857) decreased the increase in the investments account to a
level of $399,143 rather than $560,000.
Working capital was larger or smaller when the regional passed its
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savings depending on the distribution method selected by the local.' The
variables that affected working captial in these comparisons were 1) the
cash portion of the regional's positive patronage and 2) the taxes and or
cash patronage paid on the local's positive distributions.
When the regional held its savings, the local cooperative experienced
neither of these effects on working capital. When the regional passed
its savings, the local cooperative's working capital was affected by
both. Cooperative eight's cash portion of the regional's allocation was
$140,000 (assumes the regional passed its savings). This value was
larger than cooperative eight's uses of working capital for taxes or cash
patronage only when cooperative eight distributed its positive net
savings as qualified allocations with 20% cash. This was the only case
where working capital in cooperative eight was higher when the regional
passed its savings compared to working capital when the regional held its
savings The distribution methods employed by the local in other cases
caused lower working capital.
Member net cash flows were higher or lower when the regional passed
its savings. The result depended on the local's distribution methods.
Each of the four distribution methods used by the local to distribute
positive net savings when the regional passed positive patronage were
compared to the corresponding distribution methods used by the local to
distribute negative net savings when the regional held its savings.
When local cooperative eight held its positive net savings, member
net cash flows were zero. When the local cooperative held its net
savings, member net cash flows depended only on the ITCs available for
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use by the members after corporate taxes were paid at the cooperative
level. Since the regional passed its savings, cooperative eight was
forced to use the ITCs to offset the income taxes required on the
positive distribution. If the regional held its savings, the local tax
liability was zero and the ITCs were passed to members. Thus, member net
cash flows were lower when the regional passed its savings (zero compared
to the ITCs being passed).
When local cooperative eight passed its positive net savings as
qualified equity with 20% cash, member net cash flows were negative.
This result occurred because the cash portion members received was
insufficient to cover the taxes paid on the whole distribution. If the
regional held its savings, members received a negative qualified
distribution. This reduced their collective tax liability and caused
positive net cash flows. Thus, member net cash flows were lower when the
regional passed its savings than when the savings were held at the
regional level.
When local cooperative eight passed its positive net savings as
qualified equity with 50% cash, member net cash flows were positive but
decreasing as the average tax bracket got higher. The cash portion
members received was constant and the collective tax liability increased
as the averag'e tax bracket was assumed to increase. When the regional
held its savings, members received negative qualified distribution which
reduced their tax liability. The higher the average tax bracket the
greater the reduction in tax liability. Since these net cash flows were
smaller for all average tax brackets, cooperative eight's member net cash
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flows were larger when the regional passed its savings.
When local cooperative eight passed its positive net savings as
nonqualified equity, member net cash flows were zero. This result
occurred because no cash distribution was paid to members and the
cooperative used ITCs to pay its taxes on the distribution. When the
regional held its savings, the member net cash flows were positive as de
scribed in the previous two paragraphs. Thus, member net cash flows were
lower when the regional passed its savings.
The situation where the regional passed positive patronage less than
the local's negative local savings caused cooperative eight to have
higher levels of member equity and total assets. The results for working
capital and member net cash flows depended on cooperative eight's
distribution method. These relationships for member equity and total
assets and the ambiguity of working capital and member net cash flow were
found in all eight cooperatives analyzed.
Summary of regional gain situations The relationships
presented for each of the two regional gain situations were generally
consistent. Both situations showed larger levels of member equity and
total assets when the regional passed its savings. Working capital was
higher (situation one) or ambiguous (situation two) when the regional
passed its safvings. The ambiguity arose due to the proportion of
regional's allocation that was paid as cash and to the local's
distribution method. The impact of the regional's distribution on member
net cash flow was also ambiguous depending on the local's distribution
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method. These generel relationships were consistent for each of the
eight cooperatives regardless of the variability in net savings among
them or in the differences of their balance sheets.
Summary of regional comparison The five situations discussed in
comparing the regional's distribution methods allowed identification of
some definite effects to the local cooperative and its members but other
effects were ambiguous. Member equity and total assets were increased
when the regional passed its positive savings compared to when the
regional held its positive savings. Member equity and total assets were
decreased when the regional passed its negative savings compared to when
the regional held its negative savings. Working capital was not smaller
when the regional passed its earnings (savings or loss) except when the
regional passed its savings with a low proportion as cash. Member net
cash flows could not be consistently predicted based entirely on the
regional*s distribution decision. The relationship was dependent on the
local's distribution decision and the size of allocation in addition to
the regional decision. The implications of these relationships are
outlined in Chapter 5, The next section examined the local's
distribution methods for net loss situations keeping the regional's
distribution method constant.
Comparison of local's distribution method
Finally, a comparison of the local's distribution methods were
analyzed. Unlike the regional's comparisons, the local's comparisons
involve strictly the distribution of losses. Four such situations
occurred: 1) the local's negative regional refund was greater than
115
the local's gain (A.l. of Figure 3.1), 2) the local's negative regional
refund was accompanied by a local loss (A.3.)> 3) the regional held
its earnings while the local sustained a loss (B.I.), and 4) the local's
positive regional refund was less than the local's loss (C.2.)- Each
of these situations are contained within the tables used for the regional
comparison. Columns five and six of Tables 3.1._, columns three and four
of Tables 3.3._, columns one and two of Tables 3.4._, and columns three
and four of Tables 3.4._ show the four situations for comparison,
respectively.
In each situation for each cooperative, the members received a
higher net cash flow if the local cooperative passed the loss rather than
held it. This was again based on the assumption that the passed losses
can be used by the members currently or carried forward or backward. The
members benefited from the loss allocations without adversely affecting
the financial position of the local cooperative. Working capital, total
assets, and total member equity were the same whether the local passed or
held the loss. These observations were consistent for all 32
comparisons. Again the implications were left to Chapter 5.
Conclusions
Both the regional and local comparisons of whether to pass or hold
net savings when losses were involved expressed relationships from an
accounting viewpoint. In general, the relationships were consistent for
each of the eight cooperatives examined. However, due to the size of net
savings and the cooperative's classification, some unique situations
occurred which should be considered in the allocation of losses.
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First, the allocation of losses may lead to negative accounts.
Table 3.1.3 colunm five. Table 3.1.8 colunm five, and Table 3.3.3 column
three are the only examples of the data containing negative accounts.
All three resulted from the regional passing a relatively large loss and
the local holding the net loss by reducing the unallocated retains
account. The consequences of a negative unallocated retains account are
not clear. The IRS may not allow such a situation and require the
cooperative to pass the loss.
The possibility exists that when the loss is passed the loss
allocation to the member may exceed the accumulated equity (member's
investment) retained in past years. The quantitative analysis provides
no such results for the producer member's investment since the analysis
did not track individual producer member's balance sheets. However, the
local cooperative presented in Table 3.1.1 shows its share of the regional
loss as -$250,000. Tables 3.1.2 - 3.1.8 show the other local cooperat.'ve's
share of their regional's loss as -$700,000 each. If the projections for
the cooperative in Table 3.1.1 had been run with a regional refund of
-$700,000, then the regional's loss allocation to its member (local
cooperative one) exceeded the accumulated equity (local cooperative one's
investment) retained in past years. Under such a situation, the
following changes would have occurred in Table 3.1.1, columns one and
two.
1) Net savings decreased from -$112,612 to -$562,612.
2) Working Capital was unaffected.
3) Investments decreased from $29,827 to -$420,173.
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4) Unallocated retains (column one) or Allocated equity (column two)
decreased $450,000 depending on the local's distribution method.
5) The total asset account decreased $450,000,
6) Member net cash flows were the same if the local held the net
loss or were larger if the local passed the net loss.
The negative investments amount to an account receivable in which
future years patronage would offset the negative value. The regional
cooperative may be forced to recoup the loss through unallocated retains
if the local would terminate its business with that regional as discussed
earlier. This same circumstance exists for the local cooperative's
members.
Second, the passing of losses may drive unallocated retains'
proportion of member equity above the 50% level such that the cooperative
may lose its exempt status. Table 3.1.6 column six and Table 3.3.6
columns two and four are the only examples from the dat^- in which
unallocated retains exceeded 50% of total member equity. This is
contrary to provision 499.3 in the Iowa Code limiting the sized of
unallocated retains to less than 50% of equity. It is not clear whether
or not such "involuntary or unintended" moves to noncompliance with such
a state statute would be accepted as a valid reason to exceed the limit.
If not acceptable, then a mixture of distribution methods may be needed
to handle losses.
A mixture of distribution methods may be a more common strategy in
reality. For research purposes, the pure cases were used to define
limits. Simulations of the impacts of a distribution methods were
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simpler and more distinguishable without mixtures. The comparisons of
the local's loss distribution methods showed that members received higher
net cash flows when the local passed its loss. However, if passing the
loss creates problems of collecting the loss or in trying to maintain
compliance with state law, then the local cooperative may need to
determine whether the loss allocation maximizes net member benefits in
the long run.
Third, the use of investment tax credits played an important role in
the member net cash flows. This can easily be seen by comparing Tables
3.1.5 - 3-5.5 with any of the other cooperatives corresponding tables.
Cooperative five's $101,718 of ITCs allowed positive net cash flows to
members where many of the other cooperatives* members received negative
net cash flows. ITCs also help the cooperative by reducing the tax
burden and substituting as cash patronage^ for levels paid over the 20%
minimum. Since ITCs are lost by the cooperative if not used in the
current year the cooperative system benefits by being able to pass these
credits to their members. This is especially true in years losses occur.
Finally, the cooperatives use of dividends (on a small scale) did
not affect the relationships presented. Tables 3.1.1 - 3.5.1 present the
projections for cooperative one. These projections were run with the
cooperative paying dividends whether or not the cooperative sustained
negative net savings. Usually, the cooperative does not pay dividends
when it sustains a loss but the relationships still hold if the
cooperative does.
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CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT VALUATION
Valuation of the investment in a cooperative is an inexact
procedure. However, it is likely that cooperative members subjectively
perform such a valuation. In the federated structure (the relationship
as described in Chapter 1) the local cooperative receives a share of the
regional net savings in proportion to the business conducted with the
regional. The noncash portion of this allocation is accumulated and
carried on the asset side of the balance sheet (as Investments in other
cooperatives) until redeemed or retired in the future.
The local cooperative's investment is typically valued at an amount
equal to the noncash patronage received over the years less any amount
retired. The net accumulations value the local cooperatives' equity held
in the regional cooperative at any given moment. This section examines
some of the characteristics ox investments and some of the difficulties
in valuing them.
Appropriate Characteristics of an Investment Valuation Method
Most valuation procedures for corporate stock or equity are based on
earnings or net operating income. The earnings are capitalized using a
weighted average cost of capital deriving the market value of the firm.
It is inappropriate for the local cooperative to value its investment in
the regional using regional net savings in such a fashion. The local
cooperative's share of the regional*s net savings is based on the
patronage in that year, not on the size of the local's investment. Thus,
a cooperative with a small investment and a large patronage would
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overvalue its investment if it capitalized the earnings. By the same
logic, a cooperative with low patronage and a high level of investment
would undervalue its investment under a system that capitalizes earnings.
The local cooperative's psychological valuation of investments in
the regional cooperative is to some extent based on the regional's yearly
net savings. The local cooperative must also consider how the regional's
net savings are distributed and what equity revolvement or retirement
program the regional uses. Each of these affects the net incremental
change in and discounted present value of investments in other
cooperatives.
If the regional distributes a portion of its net savings as
unallocated retained earnings, in theory the regional's ability to pay a
higher cash portion, more promptly retire equity or its value upon
liquidation should be enhanced. If the regional distributes a portion of
its net savi.igs as allocated equity, the local cooperative values only
the noncash part of the allocation that remains as equity in the
regional. The cash part moves directly into the local cooperative's
equity category after taxes since it is paid currently. Any amount
retired by the regional is returned to the local cooperative and reduces
the value of the local cooperative's investment in the regional. The
local cooperative can not sell its investment (nonmarketable equity) and
little or no return is given on allocated equity. Thus, the local
cooperative should (holding other variables constant) place a higher
value on its investment the sooner it is retired recognizing the time
value of money.
The above discussion can be briefly and concisely summarized in the
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following functions and equations.
(1) V = f( NS, RT) where V = the value of the investment
NS = net savings
RT = the equity retired
Function (1) presents the value of the investment as a function of
net savings and retirement. Holding net savings constant, the more
equity the regional retires the lower the value of the investment.
However, when holding retirement constant, an increase in net savings has
different impacts on the value of investments depending on how they were
distributed. Excluding the possibility of dividends, net savings may be
distributed as allocated equity or as unallocated retains. Allocated
equity may be distributed in noncash or cash form. Equation (2) presents
this relationship.
(2) NS = ( NC + C ) + UR where NS = net savings
NC = the noncash portion of
allocated equity
C = the cash portion
UR = unallocated retained earnings
Expressing equity retirement as a function h(X,T) of the dollars
retired (X) and the length of the revolving fund (T), then function (1)
can be reexpressed as in function (3).
(3) V = f C g(NC, C, UR). h(X, T) )
Expressing the cash portion of allocated equity as a function of the
noncash portion and using the implicit function rule, function (3) can be
reduced to function (4) below.
(4) V = k(NC, UR, X, T)
The partial derivatives of this function are useful to observe and
are shown below.
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3V 3V> 3V 3V
> 0 = 0 < 0 < 0
3NC 3UR ^ 3X 3T
The ambiguous sign of the second partial is due to the following
problem. The more net savings distributed as unallocated retained
earnings, the less net savings that can, be distributed as the allocated
noncash - thus, a negative partial derivative. At the same time, the
more net savings distributed as unallocated retained earnings, perhaps
the better the regional's ability to retire equity sooner - thus, a
positive partial derivative. This assumes that the regional cooperative
intends and achieves positive net savings while maintaining its
competitiveness and other variables are constant.
Investments at Face Value
The current technique of investment valuation ignores the effects of
net savings distributed as unallocated retained earnings and of the
length of time taken to return retained allocated equity. The effects of
these factors are not reflected on the local balance sheet when the
regional cooperative does not pass its negative net savings to the local.
In such a case, the regional's unallocated retained earnings are reduced.
The local cooperative s investment at face value does not change even
though total member equity has been reduced and the regional's ability to
pay cash patronage and to redeem noncash patronage may be hampered.
The need for a more appropriate technique of investment valuation
may be brought out with a comparison of the local's investment in the
regional versus the producer's investment in the local. As mentioned,
the local cooperative carries the full face value of its net accumulated
noncash patronage with the regional as an asset account (investments).
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The producer, before the 1980s, usually did not carry its net accumulated
noncash patronage from the local cooperative as an asset. In so doing,
the producer subjectively valued his/her investment as zero. What is the
basis for these two extremes?
Ideally, the local cooperatives may put a higher valuation on their
investment because they may expect the net accumulated noncash patronage
to be returned sooner and more reliably than what producer members may
expect. A shorter revolving period is important when considering
inflation and opportunity cost. Since these equities do not collect
interest, inflation decreases the real value of these equities the longer
the retirement is postponed. Additionally, the funds could be used for
other purposes bearing larger returns.
The difference in the valuation of investments by the local
cooperative and producer member may be partially due to the accountants'
role. Whatever the difference the importance of this comparison is
brought out when considering what the debt load should be for each the
producer and the local cooperative. Debt load is usually based on the
earnings potential of total assets and existing claims against these
assets. Since the local cooperative carries its investment in the
regional as an asset, the local cooperative's debt load may have been
partially based on its investment. If the producer does not carry its
investment in the local as an asset, then the producer's debt load is
most likely not based on its investment. Recently, due to the farm debt
crisis, some lenders have placed liens on producer's intangible assets
which include the producer's investments in the local. If the liens
consider the investment at full face value, the producer member's
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situation (like the local cooperatives) may have debt partially based on
overvalued assets.
Figure 4.1 presents the chain of equity handed down from the
interregional to the regional to the local cooperative. The regional*s
and local's investments may have been partially derived from the same
interregional dollars of noncash patronage. If both the local and the
regional cooperative have debt based on these dollars, then these dollars
are probably over leveraged.
Interregional balance sheet
I Debt 10,000,000
Other 20,000,0001 Equity 10,000,000 D/E=l
TA 20,000,0001 TL&E 20,000,000
Regional balance sheet
Other 1,500,0001 Debt 1,000,000
Inv 500,0001 Equity 1,000,000 D/E=l
TA 2,000,0001 TL&E 2,000,000 D/E'-=2
Local balance sheet
Other 375,0001 Debt 250,000
Inv 125,0001 Equity 250,000 D/E=l
TA 500,0001 TL&E 500,000 D/E'^=2
Note: (1) E"* is equity not offset by investments (total equity
minus investments)
(2) All three balance sheets assumed the cooperative was
• financed with 50% debt and equity and investments were
25% of total assets.
Figure 4.1 Comparison of debt to equity ratios for total and local
equity
When the regional cooperative suffers a loss and holds it (doesn't
pass or "reveal" it), the regional cooperative is expressing an illusion
of equity strength that the local cooperative used to support debt. The
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inclusion of the full face value of the investment overstates the actual
debt load the system may "safely" carry. Considering the substantial
part of the local cooperative's equity tied up as investments in the
regional makes the situation even more precarious.
The local cooperative's investment has become more important in
relation to equity and assets. In 1980, the local cooperatives of the
three Midwestern states sampled in Chapter 2 had investment to member
equity and investment to total asset ratios averaging .370 and .189,
respectively. In 1984, the ratio averages had increased to .425 and
.229, respectively. Since average levels for equity and total assets
increased between these two periods, the increase in the ratios were due
to a relatively larger increase in investments. The data described are
presented in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 presents the number of cooperatives
having high investment to equity ratios. Comparing the two years, the
number of cooperatives hwing over a 50% ratio increased from 13.7% to
23.7% of the sample.
Using the concept of local equity defined in Chapter 1 (local equity
equals total equity less investments) and used in Figure 4.1, the
importance of the appropriate debt load may be expressed. Term debt to
equity (total) ratios for 1980 and 1984 were .340 and .280, respectively.
These ratios value the investment at full face value. Assuming
investments were not included or became worth nothing the term debt to
local equity ratios were .674 and .469 for 1980 and 1984, respectively.
Table 4.3 presents these values as well as the values of tne ratios when
investments were considered to be worth 80%, 60%, 40%, aad 20% of their
book value (full face value). Also included in Table 4.3 are the
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Table 4.1 1980 and 1984 average investment and equity data for the
three Midwestern states sampled in Chapter 2
1980 1984
N Averages N Averages
Investments to Total Assets 241 .189 242 .229
Investments to Member Equity 241 .370 242 .425
Investments ($) 241 621,065 242 808,466
Total Assets C$) 241 3,447,860 242 3,668,519
Total Member Equity ($) 241 1,687,220 242 2,003,372
Table 4.2 Number of cooperatives in three state sample with large
investment to member equity ratios
Total number of cooperatives with investment to member
equity ratios greater than:
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
In 1980: 33 13 5 2 1 0
(n=241)
In 1984: 55 35 17 14 9 7
(n=242)
Table 4.3 1980 and 1984 term debt to local equity ratios with various
levels of investment used in defining local equity
1980 averages 1984 averages
(N = 230) (N = 226)
Term Debt
. unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted
to:
(Equity - 100% Investments) .674 .524 .469 .443
(Equity - 80% Investments) .535 . 446 .855 .359
(Equity - 60% Investments) .462 .389 .800 . 366
(Equity - 40% Investments) .411 .355 .386 .296
(Equity - 20% Investments) .372 .328 .319 .254
(Equity - 0% Investments) .340 .305 .280 .234
Note: adjusted average is the mean of the observations within
two standard deviations of the unadjusted mean
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adjusted averages, since the value of the ratios became quite variable as
the investment value approached the value of equity. Depending on the
actual value of investments, the cooperative's term debt to equity ratio
may be well above what was intended.
Adjustments to Valuation Method
For these reasons, the current valuation method needs to be adjusted
to determine how good of an investment this noncash patronage refund
really is. Such adjustments may give a real (not an illusory) picture of
equity strength and cooperative value, may show the dependency of locals
on regionals, and may show the cooperative's competitiveness. Such
information would be helpful to the cooperative in determining optimal
methods of earnings allocation and equity retirement to keep it
competitive in the industry.
To avoid the current valuation problems, the valuation of the
local's investment in the regional (or the producer's \nvestment in the
local) at face value must be adjusted to consider the timing of the
retirement. Adapting the traditional investment valuation method to
consider the time value of money, produces a more realistic, but yet
practical, valuation technique.
The technique would discount current noncash allocations based on
the length of the revolving fund. Such discounting methods were used by
Fenwick, Tubbs, and Wilson in their cooperative finance policy and capital
structure studies as discussed by Beierlein and Schrader (3). Such a val
uation technique requires determining a cost of capital, but considers net
savings, the noncash allocation, and the length of the equity revolving
fund. The cost of capital may be thought of as an opportunity cost. Tlie
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opportunity cost should reflect the cost of not being able to use the
investment dollars for some other purpose. Thus, the interest rates on
debt and the cost to members on equity not retired should be considered.
The portion of net savings distributed as unallocated retained
earnings may also be considered in this technique, both directly and
indirectly. It is directly considered because it would result in smaller
noncash accumulations and it is indirectly considered because it should
reduce the length of the revolving fund cycle. For example, if the
cooperative sustains a loss which it holds, then the member's should
expect the cooperative's ability to redeem equities to be reduced and the
revolving period to increase. The longer revolving period reduces the
value of the investment under present value calculations.
This valuation procedure provides an alternative technique to value
the member's investment in the cooperative. The technique could be used
by the producer members or the local cooperative members to value their
investments. Some differences in discount rates and lengths of revolving
funds would be expected, but the technique should be consistent for all
users. A valuation procedure based upon the length of the revolving
cycle is not without its problems. Determination of the length of the
revolving cycle in some cooperatives would be a difficult task when no
consistent retirement program is established. This adjusted valuation
technique is also no better in determining a value of investments till
after the years distribution.
Summary
The current accounting practice for local cooperatives is to carry
investments in other organizations at face value of the net accumulated
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noncash patronage. This practice does not consider effects of
unallocated retains, losses, and change in the value of assets held by
the regional cooperative. Thus, the regional's ability to pay higher
levels of cash, retire equity sooner, or increase asset productivity may
be affected without the local cooperative's investment valuation showing
it. Alternative means of valuation need to be derived to consider these
factors but the characteristics of the cooperative system, such as
nomnarketable equity, makes this difficult. A valuation procedure based
upon the length of the revolving fund cycle may be a better alternative.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examined losses for agricultural cooperatives in the
North Central region by documenting their occurrence, analyzing their
financial impacts to the cooperative and its members, and identifying
their significance on investment valuation. The scope of the analysis
covered regional and local losses including "hidden" losses that may
not be obvious. Such hidden losses may result from either blending
regional earnings with local earnings or holding losses within the
regional or local cooperative.
Documentation of Losses and Means of Loss Distribution
Agricultural cooperative losses have become more frequent. The
600-plus local cooperatives sampled showed an increase in the frequency
of negative net savings of twelve percentage points (28% from 16%)
since 1982 and an increase of eighteen percentage points (28% from 10%)
as compared to the 1976 study conducted by Griffen et al« (8). As
shown in the federated cooperative analysis, regional and interregional
cooperatives have sustained losses during the early 1980s also. None
of the local cooperatives sampled received negative patronage refunds,
but the size of the average regional patronage from all sources has
decreased markedly, and in the case of some regionals, they have become
nonexistent.
At the same time, agricultural cooperative losses have increased
in size. The local cooperatives sampled showed an increase in the
average size of negative net savings from -$110,500 to -$130,500 over
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the last two years. Part of this has been from the decreased positive
regional patronage refunds mentioned above. Another factor has been
the decrease in the local savings in many cooperatives over this time
period. Griffen's 1976 study compared to the analysis conducted on the
1984 data in this research showed that the average size of the net loss
over this eight year period has increased by more than 35% from
-$95,893 to -$130,515.
With losses occurring throughout the federated system, more
attention has been focused on the legal means for loss distribution and
effects of loss distribution on local cooperatives and their members.
The cooperatives sampled (local, regional and interregional) generally
distributed their loss by reducing unallocated retained earnings. The
Iowa sample had average distributions to unallocated retained earnings
of 98% when a net loss occurred and 54% when net savings occurred.
Compared to Griffen's 1976 study, the usage of the unallocated reserve
account for earnings distribution (savings as well as losses) has
increased. This increase has shown up in the average equity makeup of
the cooperative. Unallocated retained earnings have increased 11.8
percentage points to 26.9% of total equity over the eight year period
analyzed.
Financial Impacts from the Distribution of Losses
The increased frequency and size of losses appears to have changed
the nature of distribution of gains to a more precautionary one. The
trend toward distributing more of net savings as unallocated retained
earnings may have been adopted in order to build retains to allow
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losses to be held rather than distributed. These decisions appear to
have been made more for public relations and simplicity than as part of
a planned strategy to maintain financially sound cooperatives and
provide maximum member benefit. This study compared regional and local
cooperatives' distribution methods of holding (not passing) the loss
versus passing the loss to members through reductions in allocated
equity.
The study examined the financial effects the distribution method
had on the following financial aggregates in the local cooperative:
total member equity, allocated equity, unallocated retained savings,
investments, total assets, working capital, and member net cash flows.
The analysis assumed 1) a federated cooperative system in which the
regional patronage could be netted with the local's savings,
2) earnings composed of ordinary net savings (operating income)
excluding extraordinary items, and 3) the cooperative's assumed
objective was to maximize after tax net member benefits.
Conclusions of Quantitative Comparison
The results of the comparison between the regional passing or not
passing its net savings are summarized in Table 5.1. The results for
each of the financial aggregates are expressed as positive or negative.
These signs relate the values when the regional passed its earnings or
losses to the values for when the regional held its earnings or losses.
The interpretation of the sign as desirable or undesirable depends on
the financial aggregate and the specific conditions of the local's
distr ibution.
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Under the assumption that the regional passed a loss, the local
cooperative's total assets were lower and member equity was lower, but
working capital was not lower when compared to the situation where the
regional held its loss.
The implied reduction of total assets may be desirable or
undesirable depending on the type of assets reduced. Liquidity and
productivity are two of the most important factors to consider. The
negative effect of the regional passing its loss affected total assets
through the investments in other organizations account. This is not a
liquid asset, and future earnings do not depend upon its magnitude.
Thus, the earnings potential of the local cooperative was left with no
decrease specifically attributable to the regional's noncash loss
allocations. Indeed, if the local cooperative has positive savings,
the reduction of the investment account has the effect of increasing
working capital. This may actually increase the cooperative's asset
productivity by reducing an asset account that does not directly affect
the level of return.
The other important factor considered when total assets were
reduced was the cooperative's liquidity. The regional's loss
allocation reduced the nonliquid investment account and increased the
cooperative's- liquidity by a lesser amount. The increased liquidity is
desirable and may further be enhanced when the local cooperative's
positive savings are allowed to be held as an asset without taxation.
In this case, the regional's loss allocation reduced the cooperative's
tax liability on its positive savings and allowed working capital to be
used for other purposes.
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The implied reduction of member equity may be desirable or
undesirable in achieving the cooperative's objective, depending on the
distribution method selected by the local cooperative. When the local
cooperative passed its net savings to its members, the reduction was
desirable. Reductions in member equity via allocated equity were
desirable because the cooperative's future equity retirement liability
was reduced. When the local had negative savings, the decreased
allocated equity reduced the equity retirement liability directly
without any loss in liquidity. Such a loss would have occurred when
allocated equity was reduced by retirement. When the local had
positive savings, the regional's loss allocation reduced taxable
earnings and indirectly enhanced the cooperative's capability to retire
equity in the future on a shorter revolving fund.
When the local cooperative held its net losses, the reduction was
undesirable. The reduced member equity occurred through unallocated
retained earnings. Thus, the equity retirement liability to local
patrons was not reduced—allocated equity remained constant—and the
cooperative's capability to retire equity was reduced. This may leave
patrons' expectations for equity retirement based on an illusion of
finaneial strength.
The implied increase or unchanged level of working capital were
desirable effects of the regional passing a loss. Working capital was
unaffected by a regional loss when a local loss occurred. Considering
the decreased total assets and member equity (if local sustains losses),
the constant level of working capital coupled with lower demand for
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working capital for equity retirement and payment of estates is
desirable.
Working capital increased when the local cooperative had positive
savings. This was due to the conversion of nonliquid investments to
liquid assets through reduced tax liability achieved by netting
positive local savings with the negative regional patronage. Increased
working capital is desirable since it can reduce the amount of seasonal
borrowing required, allow for equity retirement, purchases of added
fixed assets, and perhaps accelerated debt retirement.
Under the assumption that the regional passed a gain, the local
cooperative's total assets were higher, member equity was higher, and
working capital may have been higher or lower than the alternative that
the regional held its savings. The increases in total assets and
member equity were expected. The relevant factors in these situations
were the effects of the regional's distribution method on working
capital and local cooperative member net cash flows.
Only one case in the five local/regional earnings situations
analyzed showed an implied reduction in working capital. This case
occurred when the regional allocated positive savings that exceeded the
local loss. The reduction occurred when the regional paid a low
proportion of- its positive allocation to the local as cash. This leads
to the conclusion that negative cash flow effects on the local are of
more concern when the regional passed positive savings with a low cash
portion than when it passed negative savings.
The situation where the regional allocated savings less than the
local loss and the local passed the net loss to its members was also
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examined. The regional savings resulted in the local cooperative's
members receiving a reduced net cash flow as compared to the case where
the regional held its savings. It is significant that the regional can
allocate its earnings (savings or losses) and affect producer members
from a cash flow perspective. The local's distribution method,
earnings size, ITCs available, and the local's share of the regional's
allocation will be different for each cooperative, and each of these
affect the net cash flow that producer members receive.
The results of the comparison between the local passing or holding
its net loss were concise. The results indicate that there were no
differences in the local cooperative's total assets, member equity, and
working capital when the local passed its loss compared to when the
local loss was held. Although there was no difference in these
financial aggregates, the decision to pass or hold was nevertheless
important.
Total member equity decreased whether the local cooperative passed
or held its loss. However, if the local passed the loss, allocated
equity was reduced. This reduced the local cooperative's equity
retirement liability as discussed in the regional comparison's
conclusions. Holding the loss may create a reduction in the
cooperative's' ability to retire equities in the future. Thus, the
holding of a loss by the local may create an unjustified illusion of
financial strength in the minds of patrons. Unrealistic expectations
for revolving equity may follow this illusion.
Working capital in the local analysis increased or decreased,
depending on the sign of the local savings. If local savings were
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positive, working capital increased. If local savings were negative,
working capital decreased. In general, for the latter to be true, the
regional's cash portion of allocation had to be less than the negative
distribution generated by the local.
An important result identified by the comparison between the local
holding or passing its loss was the increased member cash flows when
the cooperative passed its loss. Members received a tax deduction
which could be used currently, carried forward, or carried back to
offset taxable income, thereby reducing tax payments. This benefit
assumed that the advantage of the tax deduction outweighs the
discounted value of equity at retirement when the equity was revolved
out in the future. The fact that holding a loss at the local level
tends to extend revolving periods reinforces the likelihood that the
current benefit will indeed outweigh the discounted value of future
retirement (11 p. 201).
The member net cash flows in the regional comparison were not
clear due to a number of factors. To determine the effect the
regional's allocation on member net cash flows, it was necessary to
consider both Che magnitude and sign of the local's earnings and the
distribution method employed. Although the effects were determined,
they were not consistent in regard to the regional's allocation method.
Member net cash flows were influenced by the regional passing its
earnings but the cash flows may have been reduced, left unchanged or
increased depending on the distribution method selected by the local
and the impact the regional's allocation had on the size of the local's
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distribution. Table 5.2 presents the effects of the regionals's
allocation method on member net cash flows. The actual value of member
net cash flow depends not only on the regional's allocation method, the
local's allocation method, and the relative sizes of the local and
regional earnings, but also on the level of ITCs available, and each
individual patron's tax bracket.
Implications of Quantitative Analysis
The analysis of the regional and local financial relationships
derived from the comparisons of passing losses versus holding them have
implications for regional and cooperative boards.
1, First, the analysis shows that the federated cooperative
system is indeed a system. This implies that a degree of
coordination between local and regional distribution methods
is necessary to achieve maximum member benefits for producers.
Selection of the simplest and/or most inconspicuous means of
handling a loss at either the regional or local levels (or
both) may not best serve the members. Boards at both levels
must be willing and able to examine the systemwide
consequences of distribution on both the member and the
cooperative corporation if the members are to be well served.
2. The analysis shows that negative allocations by the regional
cooperative do not damage the local cooperative's liquidity,
earning capacity, or survivability. This indicates that much
of the perceived reluctance on the part of regionals to
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acknowledge losses to member cooperatives is unfounded from
the standpoint of finance.
3. The analysis demonstrated that local cooperative losses are
not made more damaging by receipt of a negative regional
patronage. The concern in regionals that effects on the local
cooperative already generating a loss would be financially
disastrous and worsen a bad situation is largely unfounded.
While assets and equity are smaller, survivability is not
reduced.
4. The analysis indicates that when the regional holds its loss,
the local cooperative may be left with equity retirement
problems and difficulties in settling estates due to lower
liquidity at the local level than when the loss is passed,
5. The analysis (and Chapter 4) shows that when the regional
holds its loss, the local cooperative may be left with
overstated asset values in the investment account. This may
show up in the form of reductions in measures of productivity
of assets such as return on total assets if lower regional
earnings follow. This may mislead members about the ability
to generate cash flow in the local cooperative for equity
retirement and the ability to take on added debt based on the
overstated assets.
6. The analysis shows that the local cooperative should not
automatically reject the option of passing its own locally
generated losses to its members. The local cooperative
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generally experiences no more serious adverse financial
effects from passing the loss than holding it. The members
may receive more benefit from larger positive net cash flows
when the loss is incurred than from the discounted value of
redemption over a longer revolving cycle. The local
cooperative reduces its equity retirement liability while not
reducing its retirement capability. This implies that the
ability to settle estates would not be compromised.
Statutory, Institutional, Social, and Technical Considerations
The regional and the local comparisons expressed in these
implications present the analysis from a financial viewpoint. From a
practical viewpoint, additional legal, social, institutional and
technical factors need to be considered.
1. The passing of losses may lead to negative patron accounts.
These accounts may discourage future patronage of the
cooperative by patrons holding them. This is a particularly
serious danger if there is not a conscious educational program
on the cash flow benefits and proper income tax filing
procedures.
2. The passing of losses may drive the unallocated portion of
total equity to over the 50% specified in some state
cooperative statutes.
3. The passing of losses may be more time-consuming and costly
from a bookkeeping point of view. This is particularly true
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when the losses per member are relatively small. Passing
losses under such circumstances may not be advisable.
4. The passing of losses may cause member relations problems.
Without a careful explanation of the need to pass the loss,
members may choose to conduct business elsewhere in the belief
that there will be no loss of equity if they do so.
5. During the past three decades, a bonus system for management
based on combined local and regional net savings has been
institutionalized in many local cooperatives. This may cause
some managers with positive local savings to avoid doing
business with a regional cooperative that might pass a
loss. The combination of the regional loss and the positive
local savings would reduce the base of net savings used to
calculate the bonus.
Analysis of Valuing Investments
This study also examined the impacts losses have on the current
valuation technique members use to value their investments in
cooperatives. When losses were retained by the cooperative, its
members' valuation of investments have been unchanged even though the
cooperative's, ability to retire equities may have been reduced. If the
loss had been passed, the members' investment would have been reduced,
but the cooperative's ability to retire equities may have been
maintained or improved. This disparity is not as well understood by
either lenders or patrons as would be desirable.
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Investments were shown to be an important aspect of the federated
cooperative system. Local cooperatives' investments were about 20% of
total assets and 40% of total equity. The loss of investments due to
failure by the regional has major impacts on the equity of the local
cooperative heavily invested in that regional. The definition and data
concerning the local cooperative's "local" equity provided the insight
into these effects.
Suggestions for Further Research
The research of this study shows the need for the boards of
directors, managers, and members of cooperatives to be educated as to
the effects of loss allocation alternatives. With better knowledge,
the cooperative can better fulfill its objectives and serve its
members. The following recommendations are suggested for further
research in the area of agricultural cooperative losses.
Further statistical analysis on the data presented in Chapter 2
could be performed to examine the strength of association among balance
sheet and operating statement values and operating losses. Such
analysis would provide insights as to the characteristics commonly
associated with financially sound or financially troubled
cooperatives.
These characteristics found for financially troubled cooperatives
could be used to run an analysis on the probability of survival.
Survival would be the probability the cooperative remained solvent
(with consideration given to the cash rate of return and liquidity
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also) over the ten year projection. This long run analysis would
compare the probability of survival for different equity combinations
of qualified and nonqualified allocated equity.
Further research on cooperatives' board of directors, managers,
and members experience and perception about loss allocation might also
prove useful. A survey of members, managers, and boards may reveal
sound or unfounded reasons for past decisions of passing or not passing
losses. The analysis may also reveal the level of interaction between
cooperative personnel and cooperative members in the education
proces s.
Further analysis on the comparisons of the regional and local's
loss allocation methods could be performed to examine if certain
allocation methods are more favorable for cooperatives of certain
asset, equity, or working capital size. Various sizes of these
accounts would be analyzed as to the percentage change from various
size losses and allocation methods.
Further study of the member net cash flows received from losses
passed to determine the breakeven length of a revolving fund cycle
under different levels of losses and discount rates. The effects of
loss allocations on the equity retirement capability of the cooperative
could also be researched. Using a working capital standard, the
cooperative's ability to retire equity could be measured under
different sizes of loss and origins of loss. The results from both of
these studies would be beneficial for determining an appropriate
valuation of investments.
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APPENDIX A. CRITERIA USED TO SELECT THE COOPERATIVES
USED IN THE QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON
The local cooperatives were chosen to represent the three
classifications listed below.
1) Financially sound
2) High regional investment
3) Financially troubled
Each of the cooperatives chosen were screened to eliminate the use of
cooperatives that had extraordinary losses or gains and cooperatives that
had a substantial part of their equity as nonqualified equity. The
decision process in choosing the cooperatives for each classification are
discussed below.
Financially sound cooperatives were chosen to examine the impacts
losses had on "strong" cooperatives. The cooperatives labeled as
financially sound (cooperatives one and two) were selected through three
steps. The first step was to find the cooperatives that had 1983 ratios
for term debt to local equity and term debt to total equity within the
fourth quartile of the sample. This narrowed the sample to the
cooperatives that did not rely heavily on its regional cooperative and
did not have large levels of debt to pay back relative to equity. The
second step was to delete any of the cooperatives that occurred local or
net losses in any of the 1980-83 data. Of the remaining cooperatives
(third step), relative strength in working capital designated the choice
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of cooperatives to be used in the analysis.
High regional investment cooperatives were chosen to examine the
impacts losses had on local cooperatives which relied heavily on the
regional cooperative. The cooperatives labeled as high regional
investment (cooperatives three, four and five) were selected through
three steps. The first step was to find the cooperatives in the sample
with high 1980 and 1983 ration values for investment to total assets.
The second step was to find the cooperatives in the sample that had large
1980 and 1983 values for its investment account. The third step was to
correlate the two lists and pick three representative firms.
Financially troubled cooperatives were chosen to examine the impacts
losses had on "weak" cooperatives. The cooperatives labeled as
financially troubled (cooperatives six, seven and eight) were selected
through three steps. The first step was to find the cooperatives in the
sample which sustained losses in 1983. Of these cooperatives (second
step), the cooperatives were chosen that had positive local savings in
1980 and had negative local savings covered (totally or partially) by the
regional's allocation in 1981, 1982 and/or 1983. The third step was to
pick three cooperatives, one each with relatively low, medium, and high
terra debt to equity (local and total) ratios.
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APPENDIX B: ASSUMPTIONS USED IN DETERMINING
MEMBER NET CASH FLOWS
Member net cash flow refers to the cash flow of current earnings
distribution to tnerabers. The cooperative accounting simulation model
(CASM) used in the projections calculates member net cash flows via
five individual scenarios. The calculation for each scenario is as
follows:
Taxable Cash
* ITCs passed to members
= Cash Flow
- Federal Taxes (= tax rate x taxable distribution)
- Social Security Taxes (= tax rate x taxable distribution)
~ Net Cash Flow
Each scenario calculates total member net cash flows but under
different assumption of what tax brackets the membership is
distributed. Figures B.l - B.5 show the different membership
distributions for each scenario.
An important consideration in member net cash flows is the social
security taxes. Social security tax rates used in CASM were:
Years Rate
1983 and before 9.35%
1984 11.30%
1985 11.80%
1986 - 1987 12,30%
1988 - 1989 13.03%
1990 and after 15.30%
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These rates applied for members with less than a 35% marginal
income tax rate for years after 1982 and a 30% rate for years at or
before 1982. Members with greater than or equal to marginal tax rate
of 35% for years after 1982 and a 30% rate for years at or before 1982
had social security tax of zero from cooperative distributions.
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Figure B.l Distribution of member tax brackets for scenario one
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Figure B.2 Distribution of member tax brackets for scenario two
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Figure B.3 Distribution of member tax brackets for scenario three
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Figure B.4 Distribution of member tax brackets for scenario four
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Figure B.5 Distribution of member tax brackets for scenario five
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